G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive

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Even though he had personally participated in and helped to execute one of the most perfidious schemes ever directed against freedom-loving human beings, he apparently did not realize what he had done, or so he says. The important point, however, is that O'Brien speaks with authority. He was there. Obviously, a great deal of what he has to say must be taken with a large grain of salt. But what he reveals about both himself and the organization to which he is so strongly committed is, if anything, overly charitable. If O'Brien's words are incriminating in spite of his pro-United Nations bias, then they are certainly worthy of our serious consideration. For example, consider O'Brien's description of a meeting of the "Congo club," which is the nickname for his group of top United Nations planners and advisors on the Congo. Among others, Dag Hammarskjold and Ralph Bunche (representing the U.S.) were present. The Afro-Asian thesis--that the secession of Katanga would have to be ended, and that the United Nations would have to help actively in ending it--was tacitly accepted round the table, and not less by the Americans than by the others. What mattered most to all of them was that the United Nations should emerge successfully from its Congo ordeal, and it was clearly seen that a condition of success was the speedy removal of the props of Mr. Tshombe's regime, thereby making possible the restoration of the unity of the Congo. The continued existence of the independent state of Katanga was recognized as a threat to the existence of the United Nations and therefore even those who, from the standpoint of their personal political opinions, might have been favourably enough disposed to what Mr. Tshombe represented, were convinced of the necessity of strong measures. . . . This was an example of the victory of an international loyalty over personal predilections. If neutral men are simply men who put the interests of the United Nations first, then Hammarskjold and all around him at that table were neutral men. 13 Ignoring for the moment the enlightening definition of UN neutrality, one should really go back and reread this incredible statement several times to fully comprehend the extent of the calm premeditation behind the policy of deliberate deception initiated by these high officials. For months they had been issuing public statements and personal assurances that the United Nations not only had no intentions of interfering in the internal matter of Katanga's secession, but that it had no legal right to do so under the terms of its own Charter. Yet, at the very outset O'Brien, Hammarskjold, Bunche and a host of other top United Nations planners sat around a conference table and quietly worked out plans for removing "the props of Mr. Tshombe's regime." Elsewhere in his book O'Brien provided more illumination on the United Nations' total lack of integrity and respect for honesty in its pretended aims when he wrote that Mr. M. Khiary (head of UN civil operations in the Congo) . . . had little patience with legalistic detail, with paragraph this of resolution that, or what the Secretary-General had said in August 1960. He had no patience at all with the theory, often asserted in the early days by Hammarskjold, and never explicitly abandoned, that the United Nations must refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Congo. "What are we here for then?" he would ask. "Il faut faire de la politique!"
And on the word politique his brown eyes, usually so disconcertingly blank, would flash. He and Mr. Gardiner [another UN official] did "make politics," throwing all semblance of non-intervention to the winds. . . . 14 While the United Nations was pouring troops into Katanga, things were going from bad to horrible elsewhere in the Congo. On August 4, when Lumumba returned in a Russian plane from his grand tour of Belgium, the United States and England, he found unexpected opposition awaiting. Many of his former associates had decided they no longer wanted to be identified with either him or his politics. On August 10 Lumumba was seized and stoned by an angry mob in Leopoldville and barely escaped with his life. On August 25 more anti-Lumumba demonstrations and riots broke out all over the city. 15 Meanwhile, a small group of former British army officers from Rhodesia had entered Kasai province and formed a volunteer corps of leaders to train Baluba tribesmen for battle against Lumumba's men. They explained that they were sick of the West doing nothing to effectively fight the Congo's Reds. 16 On September 5 Kasavubu, president of the central government and a rather weak-kneed politician (but not a Communist), dismissed Prime Minister Lumumba. Lumumba refused to acknowledge the action and promptly dismissed Kasavubu. At this point the lower house and the senate both convened illegally without a quorum. The house invalidated both dismissals. The senate declared its confidence in Lumumba. Complete confusion and anarchy reigned supreme. Finally, on September 14 a young army colonel by the name of Joseph Mobutu, using what military power be could muster, picked up the pieces and seized control of the government. Kasavubu threw his support behind him and they appointed a committee of college graduates to run things temporarily. A semblance of order once again returned. The "student council," as they were nicknamed, acting under the leadership of Mobutu and Kasavubu, did a far more effective job of restoring order than the official government under Lumumba had done. Here was obviously a bad turn of events for the Communists. They had not planned on this. Mobutu promptly ordered all the Russian and Czechoslovakian "diplomats" and "technicians" to pack their bags and leave the country. Seeing power slip from him, Lumumba sought United Nations protection and quietly moved into the Guinean embassy. It is both interesting and significant that Lumumba chose this particular embassy for asylum. Mobutu had appealed to the United Nations to withdraw the Guinean and Ghanian contingents from its peace-keeping forces in the Congo because he had found letters in Lumumba's briefcase which clearly linked these troops with the Communists. 17 It appeared to be common knowledge throughout the Congo that many of the United Nations soldiers were openly pro-Communist. They were apparently selected for that reason. As Philippa Schuyler reported: . . . there have been many complaints from anti-Communists in the Congo that UN soldiers from certain left-leaning nations have been spreading leftist or Communist propaganda or otherwise actively aiding
Page 1 and 2: CONTENTS PREFACE FOREWORD PART I -
Page 3 and 4: FOREWORD On April 24, 1955, the Com
Page 5 and 6: PART I KATANGA A Case History Regre
Page 7 and 8: half of his face and skull. A few s
Page 9 and 10: If the Congo does go Communist, it
Page 11 and 12: Lumumba was actually in support of
Page 13 and 14: It did not take very long. A few da
Page 15 and 16: chaos to justify the harsh police-s
Page 17 and 18: NOTES 1. For background see Congres
Page 19 and 20: Letter to Patrice Lumumba Whenever
Page 21: and protested to Hammarskjold that
Page 25 and 26: e kept in mind. The most important
Page 27 and 28: We know only too well that UN force
Page 29 and 30: Here was a giant step toward unity
Page 31 and 32: the late Dag Hammarskjold. The Mosc
Page 33 and 34: 12. Lessing, p. 143. 13. Senator Th
Page 35 and 36: The contradictions and equivocation
Page 37 and 38: would send down a commissaire d’e
Page 39 and 40: the home of a Dr. and Mrs. Szeles,
Page 41 and 42: week after the United Nations had l
Page 43 and 44: 21. In addition to news reporters,
Page 45 and 46: What kind of troops were these that
Page 47 and 48: lind "killing and wounding--even in
Page 49 and 50: 6. Hempstone, pp. 178-179. 7. Senat
Page 51 and 52: PART II THE MASTER PLANNERS Communi
Page 53 and 54: Dictatorship can be established onl
Page 55 and 56: In confirmation of Cvetic's testimo
Page 57 and 58: Commerce, the Farm Bureau, and the
Page 59 and 60: Let none but Americans stand guard
Page 61 and 62: should win. Much of this was implic
Page 63 and 64: lesser posts within the United Nati
Page 65 and 66: 13. Hearings before the House Commi
Page 67 and 68: Roosevelt had been inclined to prot
Page 69 and 70: Virginius Frank Coe: Coe was anothe
Page 71 and 72: Subversion in Government Department
Page 73 and 74:
It takes the better part of a day t
Page 75 and 76:
employees loyalty board to hold hea
Page 77 and 78:
Jessup served as assistant secretar
Page 79 and 80:
26. Activities of U.S. Citizens Emp
Page 81 and 82:
the European center of nuclear rese
Page 83 and 84:
delegation upon hearing of my withd
Page 85 and 86:
Hungarian Freedom Fighters, was off
Page 87 and 88:
United States for resuming nuclear
Page 89 and 90:
NOTES 1. United Nations Guardian of
Page 91 and 92:
PART III PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE Unit
Page 93 and 94:
the name of the committee of public
Page 95 and 96:
security through governmental inter
Page 97 and 98:
principle, a public statement of ge
Page 99 and 100:
Since the United Nations claims tha
Page 101 and 102:
examination to define "fundamental
Page 103 and 104:
the Marxian point of view. . . . Th
Page 105 and 106:
peaceful solution to the conflicts
Page 107 and 108:
Touching on the subject of teaching
Page 109 and 110:
[Correct answer: "man-made."] Quest
Page 111 and 112:
possible with as little investment
Page 113 and 114:
11. Reuter's dispatch datelined Sep
Page 115 and 116:
was the man who introduced legislat
Page 117 and 118:
"mental case" with no formal charge
Page 119 and 120:
ever reaches the point where it is
Page 121 and 122:
Today and Tomorrow (New York, Harpe
Page 123 and 124:
This, of course, is exactly what ha
Page 125 and 126:
Washington. These bridges still sta
Page 127 and 128:
Secretly directing the anti-Communi
Page 129 and 130:
On November 12, 1951, General Matth
Page 131 and 132:
7. Department of State Bulletin (De
Page 133 and 134:
Shall we acquire the means of effec
Page 135 and 136:
India or Communist Poland, and thes
Page 137 and 138:
This concept of limited government
Page 139 and 140:
do a thing like that? And how many
Page 141 and 142:
18. As quoted by Clarence Manion, "
Page 143 and 144:
All of this, of course, was no mere
Page 145 and 146:
fund would need five billion dollar
Page 147 and 148:
from an executive agreement, a high
Page 149 and 150:
8. J. B. Matthews, "The World Healt
Page 151 and 152:
capacity to feed and support their
Page 153 and 154:
5. Invite five thousand Soviet "tou
Page 155 and 156:
Commenting on President Kennedy’s
Page 157 and 158:
It is a legitimate American nationa
Page 159 and 160:
For years, the master planners have
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We shall nobly save or meanly lose
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somehow prevent those units from wa
Page 165 and 166:
the following question: "Would it b
Page 167 and 168:
When the UN finally topples, it wil
Page 169 and 170:
complains about being subject to "a
Page 171:
G. Edward Griffin G. Edward Griffin
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