G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive

Washington. These bridges still stand. In his bitterness, the general exclaimed, "I realized
for the first time that I had actually been denied the use of my full military power to
safeguard the lives of my soldiers and the safety of my army. To me, it clearly
foreshadowed a future tragic situation in Korea and left me with a sense of inexpressible
shock." 13
Not only did we forbid our army commanders to fight for victory in Korea, we denied them
access to military assistance that was readily available. The free Nationalist Chinese on
Formosa had offered to send between fifty and sixty thousand fighting men to push back
the Chinese Reds. They were confident that with very little difficulty a crushing military
defeat in North Korea could set off widespread rebellion in Red China itself. The
Nationalist Chinese would have been a valuable help to our forces in any event, since
they had a reason to fight and wanted desperately to get into it. They offered troops, but
General George Marshall turned them down because it was not felt that Chiang’s troops
would be effective, and "for other reasons." On June 27, 1950, President Truman
announced: ". . . I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air
and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done." 14
We not only denied our own troops in Korea much-needed reinforcements which would
have spared us thousands of casualties, but we even sent the U.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol
the Formosa Straits to protect the Chinese Reds from attack!
In spite of these unprecedented self-imposed handicaps, General MacArthur continued to
spoil the Communist plans. At another crucial point in the fighting, the enemy once again
began to fall apart. In the last half of May they had been driven back twenty miles with
casualties estimated at one hundred thousand. In order to save them from complete
defeat and to give them a breathing spell, UN Soviet delegate Jacob Malik proposed
negotiations for a cease-fire at the 38th Parallel. And so, with our forces once again
poised on the brink of victory, MacArthur was dismissed and our forward movement was
halted. As negotiations began, our representatives carried a white flag into a formal
assemblage of armed Communists in a spot held by the Communists. Pictures were taken
and used for propaganda purposes all over Asia. The "paper tiger" was meekly suing for
peace on Communist terms!
And make no mistake about it, they were Communist terms. One of the key issues of the
early negotiations was that of a cease-fire line. We had insisted that the cease-fire line be
that point where the fighting was going on when all other major agreements had been
reached. The Communists wanted us to work it the other way around. The compromise:
we gave into their demands. Then there was the matter of ports of entry into North Korea.
We insisted that twelve major ports of entry be patrolled by our observers to insure that
the Communists were not receiving military reinforcements. The Communists said that
four ports of entry would be sufficient. The compromise: four ports of entry. Another issue
was whether or not Chinese Communists would be permitted to remain in North Korea.
We said no; they said yes. The compromise: they stayed. Another major issue was who
would supervise the truce. We said the UN; the Communists said neutral nations. The
compromise: neutral nations. These "neutral" nations, incidentally, included Communist
Czechoslovakia and Communist Poland. As General Parks later revealed in testimony
before a Senate subcommittee, this so-called neutral nations commission vetoed
inspection trips to North Korea when they could, stalled the inspections that they could not
prevent, and practiced outright collusion with the Chinese and North Korean Communists
to conceal evidence of treaty violations. 15