G. Edward Griffin - The Fearful Master - PDF Archive

would be pointless if not translated properly to the political advantage of
peace. But what happened was just the contrary. 6
There was early evidence that the North Korean forces were being trained and equipped
by the Soviets and, after the Inchon landing, that the Chinese Communists were providing
actual combat troops by the thousands. 7 Lt. General Samuel E. Anderson, commander of
the Fifth Air Force, revealed that entire Soviet Air Force units fought in the Korean War for
over two and a half years "to gain combat experience for the pilots." All in all, some 425
Migs were being flown by Russian pilots. 8 The Soviets never even tried to conceal their
part in the war. When United States Ambassador Lodge complained to the General
Assembly's political committee that "Soviet planning instigated the original aggression,
which was subsequently maintained by Soviet training and equipment," Vyshinsky, the
Soviet delegate, calmly admitted the substance of the charge and replied, "Mr. Lodge is
pushing at an open door." 9
In spite of all this, the United States Government refused to allow General MacArthur to
pursue the enemy across the Yalu River or even to bomb the bridges over which the
Chinese Communists transported their troops and supplies. The official reason given was
to prevent a war between the United States and Red China! The real reason, since we
were already in a war with Red China, was simply that the United Nations did not want us
to obtain a victory in Korea, and we had, by this time, agreed to go along with whatever
the UN wanted.
The typical view of so many of our UN allies was expressed in The Fabian Essays,
published in London in 1952, with a preface by Prime Minister Clement Attlee. On page 31
the author, R. H. Crossman, says: "A victory for either side [in the cold war] would be
defeat for socialism. We are members of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO); but this does not
mean that we are enemies of every Communist revolution. We are opposed to Russian
expansion, but also to an American victory." 10
In 1950, when Congress appropriated rather substantial sums of money to carry on the
Korean War, and it looked as though we just might start thinking in terms of pressing for a
victory, Prime Minister Attlee rushed to the United States to confer with President Truman.
His mission was aptly described by the U.S. News and World Report which stated:
The British Government continues to maintain direct diplomatic relations
with the Chinese Communists . . . even though Chinese armies were
killing British youths. . . . To Mr. Attlee, China's Mao Tse-tung still is an
official friend. . . . He does big business with the British through Hong
Kong. British businessmen are accepted in China. . . . The British want
to get rid of Chiang and turn Formosa over to the Communists. They
oppose any move inside China that might embarrass the Communist
regime. . . . Mr. Attlee still hopes for a deal covering Asia, while keeping
up the appearance of a fight in Korea. 11
Mr. Attlee was needlessly alarmed, for on November 16, 1950, President Truman
announced: "Speaking for the U.S. Government and people, I can give assurances that
we support and are acting within the limits of the UN policy in Korea and that we have
never at any time entertained any intention to carry hostilities into China." 12
When the Chinese crossed the Yalu, General MacArthur instantly ordered the bridges--six
of them--destroyed by our Air Force. Within hours his orders were countermanded from