policy - The Black Vault
policy - The Black Vault
policy - The Black Vault
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'THE BDM CORPORATION<br />
'<br />
Of<br />
particular importance in the case of the Tet offensive was the<br />
reaction of the elite decision makers who comprised Johnson's panel of<br />
advisers called the "Wise Men." <strong>The</strong>ir change of opinion concerning the<br />
viability of the US <strong>policy</strong>, coupled with fast-breaking political developments<br />
including Senator Eugene McCarthy's strong showing in the New Hampshire<br />
Democratic primary and the announcement by Robert Kennedy that he<br />
would seek the presidential nomination, were decisive in shaping President<br />
Johnson's reaction to Tet and to his own political future. In a real<br />
sense, Johnson's political career may have been a victim of the political<br />
reactions that had been stimulated by the reporting on Tet which initially<br />
presented the offensive as a significant defeat for the United States.<br />
is equally possible that Johnson's own failure to respond in a strong<br />
"presidental" manner to the Tet attacks helped to create a "crisis of<br />
confidence" in Washington, and encouraged his foes to mnove out against him.<br />
<strong>The</strong> credibility gap which developed began in the Kennedy administration<br />
and widened during the Johnson administration.<br />
It<br />
<strong>The</strong> media and the<br />
public were led slowly to the belief that government declarations could not<br />
be trusted, and the deceptions and half-truths which were told about the<br />
war were gradually proven false during the course of the war as documented<br />
by the Pentagon Papers.<br />
Concerning the necessity of avoiding the kind of<br />
credibility gap that weakened US <strong>policy</strong> in Vietnam, Bill Moyers,<br />
Press Secretary, wrote:<br />
Johnson's<br />
So much for the tension between public opinion and<br />
public officials. It should be cobvious that a President<br />
faces no quest more difficult than the search for<br />
an accurate reading of how far and how fast he can lead<br />
the people. As difficult as the task is, he must try.<br />
"He must try because there are questions on which governments<br />
dare not act without evidence of genuine<br />
support. When policies and laws outdistance public<br />
opinion, or take public opinion for granted, or fail to<br />
command respect in the conscience of the people, they<br />
lose their "natural" legitimacy.<br />
As with any rootless condition, the democratic<br />
experience then becomes infected with malaise. Pe6ple<br />
feel estranged from their government, seemingly powerless<br />
to alter the way things are. <strong>The</strong>y may challenge<br />
3-25<br />
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