policy - The Black Vault
policy - The Black Vault
policy - The Black Vault
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THE BDM CORPORATION<br />
32 <strong>The</strong> attacks against Johnson did become personal. In his small book<br />
Lyndon Johnson's Credibility Gap, James Deakin of the St. Louis Post-<br />
DiFoatch linked the growing distrust of johnson to his personality.<br />
Deakin Dlammed Johnson for his excessive secrecy and his attempts to<br />
keep the media off guard, but even more stingingly he attributed the<br />
gap to the "striking disparity" between Lyndon Johnson's public image<br />
and his private character. Deakin argued that in his private character<br />
Johnson was the archetypical "American Yankee" whose language was<br />
"heavily animalistic and scatological.". He maintained that this in<br />
itself<br />
publicly<br />
was<br />
as<br />
not<br />
a sort<br />
a problem,<br />
of Mary<br />
but<br />
Poppins<br />
Johnson<br />
in<br />
insisted<br />
Lhe W:iite<br />
in<br />
House"<br />
presenting<br />
pp. 12,<br />
"himself<br />
13, 25.<br />
33. "Television News and the Vietnam War," Panel Discussion at the Smithsonian.<br />
op.cit. Tape 1, side 1.<br />
34. Peter Braestrup, Big Story (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1977),<br />
2 Volumes, Vol. 1, pp. 48, 49. Braestrup maintains that despite the<br />
antiwar editorial stance of some of the senior editors, there was no<br />
pressure on the Saigcn bureau to conform to a "llne." Whatever biases<br />
crept intn the individual stories that appeared in the Times were<br />
those of the reporter, not of the copy desk. Hcwever, when the Tet<br />
of wen.ive story broke in 1968, the antiwar or anti-Johnson ethos in<br />
New York was an important factor in the selection of Vietnam-related<br />
stories for page one.<br />
35. Kearns, p. 350.<br />
4 36. Braestrup, p. 54.<br />
J 37. Ibid., pp. 54, 55.<br />
i 38. Ibid., p. 57.<br />
39. Ibid., p. 62.<br />
40. Ibid., p. 705.<br />
41. Mr Danipl Henken, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public<br />
Affairs recalled why a full official report of Tet was not issued to<br />
the press immediately. <strong>The</strong> DOD Public Affairs office was swamped when<br />
the Tet offensive began. Not only was the office collecting information<br />
and releasing reports on the seizure of the Pueblo, but the<br />
Thule, Greenland incident involving the loss of a nuclear weapon<br />
occurred within the same general timeframe. This kind oi coafusion<br />
at the top levels of DOD Public Affairs elevated the press reports<br />
to a level of importance as officials in Washington lacking official<br />
reports respondeL to Tet on the basis of early press reports. <strong>The</strong><br />
near-simultaneous crises coupled with the confusion and lack of<br />
reliable official infermation or assessments of the Tet debacle caused<br />
3-37