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policy - The Black Vault

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I<br />

THE 3DM CORPORATION<br />

being won and that it was not necessary to derail the extraordinary<br />

performance of the civilian economy. Those formulating economic<br />

<strong>policy</strong> were not privy to details concerning the scale of the effort<br />

that was projected for the Vietnam conflict. <strong>The</strong> lack of candor by<br />

the president and his key political-military advisors concerning the<br />

costs of the war had two results: economic planners were ill-prepaed<br />

to adjust the civilian economy to the military realities the nation<br />

was facing, and the administration's credibility suffered seriously<br />

before the Congress and the public. See Halberstam, pp. 338, 595, and<br />

604 and US Congress Joint Economic Committee, Economic Effect of<br />

Vietnam Spending, p. 5.<br />

24. Samuelson, p. 340.<br />

25. <strong>The</strong> political underpinnings of economic <strong>policy</strong> must never be overlooked.<br />

Thus, for example, the 87th Congress (1961-62) dealt harshly<br />

with Kennedy's attempts to pass legislation dealing with the problems<br />

of unemployment, education, civil rights, medical care, and environmental<br />

protection. <strong>The</strong> 88th Congress (1963-64) treated Lyndon Johnson<br />

somewhat better, passing, for example, the Civil Rights Act and the<br />

Economic Opportunity Act in 1964. Sinilarly, the 8tith Congress<br />

•, (1965-66) passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and generally<br />

acquiesced to .1ohnson's running of the Vietnam War. Ultimately,<br />

however, not even Johnson's phenomenal political skills and his willingness<br />

to compromise with congressional heavyweights such as Mills<br />

were sufficient to save him from conservative criticism of the Great<br />

Society and liberal' criticism of the Vietnam War.<br />

26. While inflation was in part attributable to the ',ar, the war was in<br />

fact often blamed as much because it was a politically expedient thing<br />

to say. By doing so, <strong>policy</strong>makers could absolve themselves of blame<br />

for their own post-Vietnam mismanagement of the inflation problem.<br />

Many of the sources cited above, in note 22, discuss the inflationary<br />

impact of the Vietnam War. To these can be added other useful references<br />

including:<br />

Edwin L. Dale, Jr.,<br />

January 4, 1969.<br />

"<strong>The</strong> Inflation Goof," <strong>The</strong> New Republic,<br />

Richard L. Strout, "How Vietnam brought inflation," Christian Science<br />

Monitor, October 11, 1974.<br />

Arthur M. Okun, et aL], Inflation: <strong>The</strong> Problem It Creates and the<br />

Policies It Requires (New York: NYU Press, 1910).<br />

Robert Eisner, "War and Taxes: the Role of the Eccnomist in<br />

Politics," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1968.<br />

&<br />

S• 4-37<br />

44 v

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