policy - The Black Vault
policy - The Black Vault
policy - The Black Vault
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THE 8MV 1 CORPORATION<br />
b. Personal Policy Predilections<br />
Like Lyndon Johnson, Gerald Ford had built his political<br />
career 3s a parliamentariar. He regarded himself as particularly astute in<br />
gauging domestic political trends; however, he recognized his need for<br />
expert opinion regarding foreign <strong>policy</strong>. Thus, immediately after taking<br />
office, Ford reappointed Henry Kissinger to the positions of Secretary of<br />
State and National Security Adviser to the President. 36/<br />
relationshin, Ford wrote in his autobiography:<br />
It would be hard for me to overstate the admiration and<br />
affection I had for Henry . . Our personalities<br />
meshed. I respected his expertise in •oreign <strong>policy</strong><br />
and he respected my judgment in domestic politics<br />
I think we worked together as well as any President and<br />
Secretary of State have worked throughout our<br />
history. 37/<br />
Concarning their<br />
Ford's reduced political base in the wreckage of the<br />
Republican Pmaty after the Watergate scandal, the continued presence of<br />
Henry Kissinger in the administration, and Ford's disinclination to undertzke<br />
new directions in foreign <strong>policy</strong>, dictated that US foreign <strong>policy</strong> with<br />
regard to Southeast Asia would continue on the course laid down during the<br />
Nixor, years.<br />
c. Impact on Vietnanm Policy Making<br />
Ford was caught in the unenviable position of attempting to<br />
pursue a course cf action in Southeast Asia that had been established by<br />
Nixon who<br />
had a broad and firm political base when the <strong>policy</strong> was set.<br />
Ford's limited political base did not allow him to marshal the force necessary<br />
to ensure North Vietnamese compliance with the Pari; Accords.<br />
communists became<br />
As the<br />
aware of the inability of the Ford administration to<br />
react either by resumed b.ombing of the North through increased aid to South<br />
A •Vietnam, the communists were emboldened to take increasingly stronger<br />
military action in the spring of 1974. In spite of Ford's direct pleas to<br />
the Congress, the congressional leadership refused to legislate the funds<br />
- •required for supporting South Vietnam. 38/ Congressional dominance in<br />
: •setting limits to US support -for South Vietnam coupled with the domestic<br />
S4--15