01.07.2014 Views

policy - The Black Vault

policy - The Black Vault

policy - The Black Vault

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

THE 8MV 1 CORPORATION<br />

b. Personal Policy Predilections<br />

Like Lyndon Johnson, Gerald Ford had built his political<br />

career 3s a parliamentariar. He regarded himself as particularly astute in<br />

gauging domestic political trends; however, he recognized his need for<br />

expert opinion regarding foreign <strong>policy</strong>. Thus, immediately after taking<br />

office, Ford reappointed Henry Kissinger to the positions of Secretary of<br />

State and National Security Adviser to the President. 36/<br />

relationshin, Ford wrote in his autobiography:<br />

It would be hard for me to overstate the admiration and<br />

affection I had for Henry . . Our personalities<br />

meshed. I respected his expertise in •oreign <strong>policy</strong><br />

and he respected my judgment in domestic politics<br />

I think we worked together as well as any President and<br />

Secretary of State have worked throughout our<br />

history. 37/<br />

Concarning their<br />

Ford's reduced political base in the wreckage of the<br />

Republican Pmaty after the Watergate scandal, the continued presence of<br />

Henry Kissinger in the administration, and Ford's disinclination to undertzke<br />

new directions in foreign <strong>policy</strong>, dictated that US foreign <strong>policy</strong> with<br />

regard to Southeast Asia would continue on the course laid down during the<br />

Nixor, years.<br />

c. Impact on Vietnanm Policy Making<br />

Ford was caught in the unenviable position of attempting to<br />

pursue a course cf action in Southeast Asia that had been established by<br />

Nixon who<br />

had a broad and firm political base when the <strong>policy</strong> was set.<br />

Ford's limited political base did not allow him to marshal the force necessary<br />

to ensure North Vietnamese compliance with the Pari; Accords.<br />

communists became<br />

As the<br />

aware of the inability of the Ford administration to<br />

react either by resumed b.ombing of the North through increased aid to South<br />

A •Vietnam, the communists were emboldened to take increasingly stronger<br />

military action in the spring of 1974. In spite of Ford's direct pleas to<br />

the Congress, the congressional leadership refused to legislate the funds<br />

- •required for supporting South Vietnam. 38/ Congressional dominance in<br />

: •setting limits to US support -for South Vietnam coupled with the domestic<br />

S4--15

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!