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policy - The Black Vault

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THE BDM CORPORATION<br />

year a number of economic <strong>policy</strong>-makers in Washington began warning that<br />

the economy's splendid performance in 1964 and 1965 was in danger of<br />

producing inflationary pressures.<br />

This advice led to twc developments.<br />

First, the Federal Reserve Board raised the discount rate from 4 percent to<br />

4.5 percent in an effort to restrict growth of the money supply. This was<br />

a significant break from the Federal Reserve Board's consistent backing of<br />

the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' expansionary economic policies,<br />

and indeed drew criticism from both the White House and Congress. <strong>The</strong><br />

second development was that in January 1966 the Council of Economic<br />

Advisors submitted a report to Johnson saying that he could not have both<br />

the war and the Great Society without either a tax increase or inflationary<br />

pressure.<br />

Johnson chose not to act on this advice because of its implications<br />

for the domestic legislation he wanted to get through Congress in<br />

1966, with Robert McNamara and others arguing privately that an admission<br />

of the war's true cost would kill any chance of this domestic legislation<br />

being passed.<br />

This decision was made easier by the fact that most economists,<br />

not having a clear indication of the war's ccst, continued to be<br />

optimistic about the economy's ability to sustain both the administration's<br />

domestic and international programs.<br />

Johnson did at this time ask for, and get from Congress, a minor<br />

increase in excise taxes, but it was not until December 1966 that he admitted<br />

that the administration had seriously underestimated the cost of the<br />

war, with his estimate of the error being $10 billion. He therefore asked<br />

Congress for a 6 percent tax surcharge in January 1967,<br />

request when the economy subsequently showed signs of slowing down.<br />

but dropped this<br />

It was<br />

not until August 1967 that he asked Congress for another tax increase, this<br />

time a 10 percent surcharge.<br />

By late 1967 inflation had taken a firm hold on the economy, but<br />

Congress was by no means eager to accept Johnson's prescription for handling<br />

it,<br />

with Wilbur Mills, chairman of the crucial House Ways and Means<br />

Committee, surfacing as the administration's p, imary antagonist on the<br />

issup. After Johnson's January call for a 6 percent surcharge, Mills<br />

challenged the necessity of such a tax increase and insisted on thoroughly<br />

4-15<br />

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