policy - The Black Vault

THE BDM CORPORATION
I
politics should stop at the water's edge. I do not at all agree .
There is no princiDle of subjection to the Executive in foreign policy.
Only Hitler and Stalin would assert that.." 4.1/
Bipartisanship served the
Truman administration well in the .arly years, permitting the president a
free hand in matters of foreign policy in spite of the fact that he-facel a
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Republican Congress.
Bipartisanship was called into question, however, in
the late 194Cs, when US policies in the Far East proved unsuccessful. The
decline of the old bipartisan consensus became marked with President
Truman's failure to consult with Congress regarding Ameriran involvement in
the Korean War, yet,fcr the most part during the Cold War years, Congress
accepteJ a strong presidency, and did little to counter presidential initiatives
in the foreign affairs arena. The legacy of bipartisanship set
the precedent for broadened powers
of the executive in foreign policy
matters, and the model of the strong executive was in place. 42/
By the early 1960s, Congress had become increasingly isolated
from foreign policy making. America. had entered an "age of crises" fol- Ž•
lowing World !.;ar I!, theroby providing the rationale for strong presidential
control. 43/ In general, Congiess concerned itself with domestic
policies and programs, and congressional involvement in foreign matters was
confined to specific issues and programs and not to ongoing debate regarding
US foreign policy. Instances of congressional participation in foreign
relations include discusqion of appropriations, passage of resolutiqt~s and
treaties, etc. ; each was largely issue oriented. Passage of the Formosan.
Middle East and Cuban Resolutions are cases in point. Passage of the
Formosan Resolution by Congress in 1955 occurred with little opposition or
debate. The debate surrounaing tne proposed Middle East Rp-solution in 1957
was especially intense as Senators Ervin and Fulbright in particular feared
that passage of a liberally worded resolution might be construed by the
president as a sign of congressional support for US participation in armed
conflict within the region 44'. Although the wording of the resolution was
altered to reflect such concerns, President Eisenhower was unconstrained
in his policies regarding the region. The Resolution could hardly be
called a contribution to the policy making process,
as Eisenhcwer sent
troops to Lebanon in 1958 without even consulting witn members of Congress.
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