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Competition in the Irish Private Health Insurance Market

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E 17.<br />

E 18.<br />

A number of <strong>in</strong>terviewees identified risk equalisation as a deterrent to<br />

entry. Uncerta<strong>in</strong>ty concern<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> future regulation of Vhi <strong>Health</strong>care<br />

and <strong>the</strong> future of <strong>the</strong> Risk Equalisation Scheme were also cited as<br />

deterrents to entry. However, a number of features of <strong>the</strong> Risk<br />

Equalisation Scheme, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g an <strong>in</strong>itial three year exemption from<br />

payments, are <strong>in</strong>tended as <strong>in</strong>centives for market entry. The absence<br />

of risk equalisation payments <strong>in</strong> a community rated market gives a<br />

regulatory advantage to <strong>in</strong>surers with lower risk profiles. The Risk<br />

Equalisation Scheme is designed to reduce but not elim<strong>in</strong>ate this<br />

regulatory advantage and <strong>in</strong>surers with lower risk profiles will<br />

cont<strong>in</strong>ue to have a significant advantage, even with risk equalisation<br />

payments.<br />

In view of <strong>the</strong> very high market share of Vhi <strong>Health</strong>care and <strong>in</strong> order<br />

to encourage competition by provid<strong>in</strong>g regulatory <strong>in</strong>centives for<br />

market entry, <strong>the</strong>re is scope to leng<strong>the</strong>n <strong>the</strong> phase-<strong>in</strong> period for full<br />

risk equalisation payments for new market entrants, while ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>the</strong> essential features of <strong>the</strong> scheme and <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tended long-term<br />

effect on <strong>the</strong> market. In <strong>the</strong> current Risk Equalisation Scheme, a new<br />

undertak<strong>in</strong>g does not have to make risk equalisation payments for<br />

three years and <strong>the</strong>re are fifty per cent payments <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fourth year<br />

with full payments <strong>the</strong>reafter. If <strong>the</strong> time period from nil to full<br />

payments was leng<strong>the</strong>ned, <strong>the</strong>re would be an <strong>in</strong>creased <strong>in</strong>centive to<br />

enter <strong>the</strong> market. Therefore, <strong>the</strong> Authority recommends <strong>the</strong><br />

follow<strong>in</strong>g;<br />

Recommendation 8<br />

The M<strong>in</strong>ister for <strong>Health</strong> and Children should consider<br />

amend<strong>in</strong>g <strong>the</strong> Risk Equalisation Scheme by extend<strong>in</strong>g<br />

<strong>the</strong> phase-<strong>in</strong> period for new entrants, for example, as<br />

follows;<br />

- no payments for <strong>the</strong> first three years<br />

- payments <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> fourth year at 25% of <strong>the</strong> full<br />

amount, ris<strong>in</strong>g to 50% and 75% <strong>in</strong> subsequent years<br />

and reach<strong>in</strong>g 100% <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> seventh year.<br />

Action By<br />

M<strong>in</strong>ister for<br />

<strong>Health</strong> and<br />

Children<br />

Barriers to Rivalry<br />

E 19.<br />

E 20.<br />

Chapter 6 discusses barriers to rivalry. Given <strong>the</strong> number of <strong>in</strong>surers<br />

<strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> marketplace, it is vital that <strong>the</strong>y compete vigorously with each<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r if consumers are to benefit from competition. Although <strong>the</strong><br />

actual process of switch<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>surers is simple and straightforward and<br />

<strong>the</strong>re are no penalties <strong>in</strong>volved, <strong>the</strong>re are low levels of switch<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> PHI market. Search costs and switch<strong>in</strong>g costs <strong>in</strong>hibit switch<strong>in</strong>g,<br />

while <strong>the</strong> psychological costs of switch<strong>in</strong>g promote <strong>in</strong>ertia and cause<br />

people to rema<strong>in</strong> with <strong>the</strong>ir <strong>in</strong>cumbent <strong>in</strong>surer even where competitors<br />

offer better value products.<br />

To promote competitive PHI markets, consumers need to be aware<br />

that it is easy to switch. They also need <strong>the</strong> necessary <strong>in</strong>formation on<br />

compet<strong>in</strong>g products. In <strong>the</strong> <strong>Irish</strong> PHI market, transaction costs of<br />

switch<strong>in</strong>g are relatively low. However, <strong>the</strong> Authority’s research<br />

11

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