Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia, Implications ...

Moira Moeliono and Ahmad Dermawan 109
capacity of local governments to actually implement decentralization in forestry has
been lacking (Hutabarat 2001). District officials have often understood autonomy to
mean the right to govern all natural resources within their region. Accordingly, district
governments issued large numbers of small-scale logging and forest conversion permits
during 1999-2002. Central government policymakers, however, considered forests to be a
strategic resource and the Ministry of Forestry has tried to keep control over this large and
lucrative resource, particularly in areas where forests extend across district and provincial
boundaries (Resosudarmo and Dermawan 2002). In 2002 the MoF passed Government
Regulation 34/2002 whereby the central government took back a significant degree of
administrative control over forests.
On the whole, there has been a significant gap between the implementation of
decentralization policies and other laws and regulations, in particular the laws related to
natural resources. From the outset of the decentralization process, uncertainty as to how
regional autonomy would affect authority over access to the nation’s natural resources among
all relevant actors has been great (MoFEC 2000). Partially as a result of this uncertainty,
de facto decentralization occurred much faster than the formal decentralization process,
particularly in the initial months following the introduction of Indonesia’s decentralization
laws in May 1999. That is, social actors with vested interests (e.g. local communities,
government, companies, and NGOs) strategically maneuvered and positioned themselves,
taking actions regarding natural resource use based on their own understandings of what
decentralization meant. In other words, the devolution of power or authority was not
always supported by the provision of an effective governance framework.
De facto decentralization meant that district governments in practice took control
over natural resources, including forests, in their regions. It also meant that districts often
only applied those regulations that were most advantageous to their own interests. In
fact, the limited ‘rule of law’ in the formal sense has frequently led to conflicts of interest
and authority, especially with regard to forest exploitation. District-level stakeholders
have been especially enthusiastic about the harvesting and trade of timber, after being
largely excluded from sharing in the benefits generated by timber extraction during the
Soeharto era (Kompas, June 18, 2001). In many respects, this has complicated efforts
by the national government to curb illegal logging and to improve forest governance
(Kompas, November 10, 2000).
At the same time, local and traditional community groups, often with support from
NGOs, have sought to reclaim their rights to manage and utilize forest resources in their
respective areas (Barr et al. 2001). Indeed, there has been a lively national discussion
on a return to governance through adat, or customary laws and practices. However, the
understandings about adat are manifold, and often conveniently adapted to contemporary
needs and demands, including the generation of financial benefits.
While local communities have taken advantage of regional autonomy, large
forest concessions have frequently found their interests undermined or threatened by
decentralization. Reclaiming rights, communities have occupied logging camps and
demanded compensation for logging activities, sometimes including compensation for
passing through a village’s territory. One good outcome of this situation is that many
concession-holders have attempted more seriously to work with local communities.
District governments, as well, fearing the new-found awareness of communities, have
paid more attention to participatory approaches to forestry and, in many cases, have
become more responsive to community demands (Syaukani 2001).