Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia, Implications ...

Christopher Barr, Ida Aju Resosudarmo, John McCarthy, and Ahmad Dermawan
better managed in decentralized settings because decision-makers are physically
located closer to where their policies will be implemented (Fisher 2000; Rondinelli et
al.1983; Conyers 1981). This proximity often brings with it improved understanding
of the specific biophysical, social, and institutional conditions influencing forest
management at the field level; better capacity to monitor the activities of forest user
groups; and greater access to local knowledge about the management and utilization
of forest resources – which are sometimes highly specific to particular social groups
and/or ecosystems (Carney 1995).
On the other hand, decentralized forest administration can also allow for greater
participation on the part of forest communities in decision-making processes, and for
more direct accountability of policymakers to peoples whose livelihoods depend on
forests (Ribot 2002; Anderson 2000; Fisher 2000; Brandon and Wells 1992). Each
of these is particularly important if decentralization is to enhance democratization
and enfranchisement in forested regions, as forest-dependent communities are often
among the most vulnerable and marginalized of social groups. Citing Edmunds et al.
(2003), Larson notes that
People living in forest areas… have been expected to cope with sometimes
drastic limitations on their choices and to yield rights of self-determination
commonly enjoyed by others living outside of forests.’ This applies to exclusion
from protected areas as well as the economic benefits of commercial logging,
while, with respect to the latter, often then having to live with the degradation
(Larson 2005).
In theory, if not always in practice, decentralization also implies a more equitable
distribution of benefits from forest resources, as local communities and governments
in forested regions are able to secure a greater portion of revenues from the extraction
of timber and other forest products (Ascher 1995; Ostrom 1990).
In spite of the opportunities it offers for increased equity and improved forest
management, decentralization also carries significant risks. For instance, national
governments have frequently devolved administrative responsibilities to lower level
agencies without transferring any real discretionary powers or decision-making
authority. As Larson (2005) explains, “In many cases the central government has outsourced
costs while maintaining control (Edmunds et al. 2003). When some powers
are, in fact, transferred to the local sphere, these usually involve responsibility without
authority (Contreras 2003; Ferroukhi and Echeverria 2003; Kassibo 2003; Larson
2003; Pacheco 2003), such as controlling crime and informal markets or carrying out
tasks delegated by the central government.”
In particular, it is highly uncommon for central governments to transfer authority
over commercial timber extraction to local governments (Larson 2005; Agrawal
and Ribot 1999). Far more often, they devolve administrative responsibilities for
less lucrative activities such as protection of watersheds or conservation areas,
rehabilitation of degraded landscapes, and management of community forests.
Larson (2005) points out that when even limited authority over commercial forestry
is devolved, “central governments also commonly maintain control over forest