Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia, Implications ...

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John McCarthy, Christopher Barr, Ida Aju Pradnja Resosudarmo, and Ahmad Dermawan 33 – preferably ‘sons and daughters of the region’ (putera daerah) – should now take key positions in provincial and district governments and in companies active in the regions (Suara Pembaruan, September 19, 1998). Actors in the districts and provinces sought to reverse the injustices and inequitable development left behind by Soeharto’s three decades in power. In many areas, villagers demanding the return of land and forest resources appropriated by timber, mining, and plantation companies began taking direct action by blocking roads, seizing heavy equipment, and demanding compensation from firms involved. In some cases, these actions escalated into violence, including for instance the burning of logging camps or physical assaults on timber and mining company employees (Wulan et al. 2004; Cohen 1998). District and provincial politicians, students and business-people also began to focus on policy and legal reform, demanding the decentralisation of decision making and fiscal powers and the revision of land and forestry laws. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) took up these calls, seeking the creation of new laws that would revitalise land reform, recognise adat institutions and customary land tenure, and facilitate community based forest management. Many groups demanded the cancellation of forest concessions and agricultural and timber plantation licenses. In addition, there were calls for an end to the national government’s long-standing transmigration program, in which large numbers of people had been moved from the densely-populated islands of Java and Madura to less-populated islands such as Sumatra and Kalimantan (McCarthy 2000). As the clamour for reform gained momentum, many provincial leaders demanded immediate autonomy. Some announced that they were considering steps to require companies operating within their jurisdictions to pay directly to the provincial governments the corporate taxes and natural resource royalties that had theretofore been collected by the central government. In the most resource rich and disenchanted provinces of Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan, and Papua (formerly Irian Jaya), some even discussed ceding from the unitary republic of Indonesia. By late-1998, the central government leadership began to discuss the fear of national disintegration (Suara Pembaruan, September 19, 1998). In counterpoint to the sound and fury of popular politics, academics, officials and NGO activists considered the underlying problems in seminars and newspaper articles. Commentators described how, from the Soekarno period onwards, the political culture of the Indonesian state had developed a monolithic approach to governance that, in the name of national unity, subsumed the very diversity celebrated in the national motto, ‘unity in diversity’ (Warren and McCarthy 2002). As one writer noted, ‘centralism’ (sentralisme) was “a special feature of the New Order [regime]” (Suara Pembaruan, April 5, 1999). This term was used to describe how powerful decision-makers in Jakarta made decisions and created regulations regarding significant issues without consultation with the regions and with little, if any, transparency and accountability to the people they purportedly represented. Such practices created a uniform governance structure that impaired the ability of regional interests to openly negotiate for their own priorities, thereby diminishing opportunities for the expression of regional aspirations and otherwise improve their well-being (Kompas, April 30, 1999; Suara Pembaruan, April 5, 1999).
34 Origins and Scope of Indonesia’s Decentralization Laws During 1998, debate concerning how to address the problems raised by the centralistic governance practices of the New Order regime focused on two problems. One immediate problem involved creating a more equitable and just division of revenue between the central and regional governments. Yet, reform needed to do more than just revise the formula for dividing revenues among the various levels of government. A second problem involved creating a form of government that would enable regional governments and local communities – in a transparent and accountable fashion – to make decisions regarding their own affairs in a way that reflected their own interests and aspirations. At that time, it appeared that the first problem could be resolved by arriving at a new formula for sharing fiscal revenues. With respect to the second problem, the Nasional Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN), led by future-Parliamentary Speaker Amien Rais, attempted to open a discussion regarding whether the concept of a federal state was better suited to Indonesia than that of a unitary state. However, senior policymakers, party leaders and other key figures were generally cynical about the Dutch imposed experiment with federalism under Soekarno, and many were spooked by a fear of national disintegration. Within a very short period, this model was deemed to be politically taboo and discussion of it was carefully foreclosed (Suara Pembaruan, December 15, 1999; Kompas, February 22, 1999). 5 Legislators and planners would only consider the problem in terms of how, within the framework of the unitary republic, the post-Soeharto state could redistribute political power and government authority to the regions. In other words, the question narrowed to one of decentralization. As an existing national law regarding regional government (i.e. Law 5/1974) already provided for some limited degree of decentralisation, national policymakers decided to focus their efforts on ‘perfecting’ this law. In this context, in November 1998 in the midst of forceful student demonstrations, Indonesia’s People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) – the highest legislative body in the country – held a special session to determine the national priorities that needed to be addressed most immediately. The MPR particularly stressed the need to “organise regional autonomy, in an equitable fashion regulating the distribution of national resources and the division of revenue between the centre and the regions, to be carried out through the formation of new laws” (MPR 1998). The MPR passed a special ‘Decree’ (ketetapan) setting out the principles for “the organization of regional autonomy; the equitable arrangement, division and utilization of national resources; and fiscal balancing among the central and regional governments within the context of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia.” 6 As regional autonomy was now seen to be a way to avoid national disintegration, decentralization had become a matter of national urgency. 3.3 Designing the 1999 Regional Autonomy Laws In early-1998 Hartono, the Minister for Home Affairs in the last Soeharto cabinet, initiated a process of legal reform in response to pressures from students and other groups for broad-based political change. On May 14, 1998, just days before Soeharto resigned, Hartono promulgated a decree (surat keputusan) setting up an internal
Page 1 and 2: Decentralization of Forest Administ
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Page 7 and 8: Preface Indonesia is currently ente
Page 9 and 10: Acknowledgements This study is base
Page 11 and 12: Abbreviations AAC ACIAR ADEKSI APBD
Page 13 and 14: IPHHBK IPHHK IPJL IPK IPKR IPKMA IP
Page 15 and 16: Glossary Adat, customary or traditi
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References Agrawal, A., Ostrom, E.
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Since the collapse of Soeharto’s
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