Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia, Implications ...

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The Impacts of Decentralization on Tenure and Livelihoods
Despite the difficulties and disappointments of this first phase of decentralization (2000-
2004), one unintended consequence emerging from the operations of the small-scale
concessions is the possible de facto recognition of local rights to forests and forest
resources (McCarthy 2004; Barr et al. 2001). In the case of Malinau district in East
Kalimantan, the recognition has taken the form of an informal codification of land rights
(Barr et al. 2001). In Kapuas and South Barito districts in Central Kalimantan, those
who wish to extract timber must now negotiate with village leaders, those who live close
by, and those who have adat rights (McCarthy 2004). One could argue that by requiring
timber companies and investors to negotiate directly with local communities, district
governments are in fact recognizing the communities’ claims. Indeed in some cases, the
requirement is that the forest be community-owned or privately owned forest. To this
end, the forests are claimed and written in the issued permits as being community or
privately owned.
Unfortunately, the fact that these rights are not formally or explicitly legally
recognized has frequently led to more confusion and conflict. Most of the areas assigned
for logging fall within the area designated (by the government) as state-controlled forest
land. Where communities or individuals are recognized as owners, the documentation
required by law is often not available. In addition, across Indonesia there is no consistent
understanding or well-defined legal process for how customary land claims should be
justified or which rights are conferred by adat. In many cases, it is also not clear who
has really benefited from the adat claims asserted through the small-scale concessions
allocated by district governments (Barr et al. 2001). It is reflective of decentralization that
outside companies and investors have been forced to seek local communities’ permission
before forests are logged or cleared, and that the district-issued timber permits have
led to increased sharing of benefits, as compared to the HPH concession system of the
Soeharto era. However, one might question whether communities have been sufficiently
informed and protected to ensure that they are not, in effect, signing away their rights
and foregoing long term benefits through small-scale concessions (Tokede et al. 2005;
Yasmi et al. 2005; Barr et al. 2001). Another emerging question relates to the definition
of ‘community’, as communities are not homogenous units and are typically made up of
different interest groups. As used by the Government of Indonesia, however, the term
generally refers to people living in one territorial unit, usually a village (Colfer 2005;
Wollenberg et al. 2005).
Recognition of people’s claims was also in the interest of local government. For
example, commercial timber harvesting in areas classified as ‘Protection Forest’ has been
made possible when the area became recognized as ‘owned’ by local people who partner
with an ‘investor’. It has also been hinted that moves to claim adat lands may be a
measure to reduce central government claims on land in order to free up forest land for
conversion to uses that are more economically lucrative for district-level stakeholders.
Others have speculated that people are anxious to acquire land ownership though smallscale
concession permits and conversion of forests because applying for a land certificate
through Indonesia’s National Land Agency (BPN) is too costly and time-consuming. Such
processes have often been dominated, however, by local and district elites. At the village
level, for instance, negotiations with the companies and government officials have often
been done by only a handful of village leaders, who usually request a disproportionate
portion of benefits for themselves or their families (Yasmi et al. 2005; Barr et al. 2001).