Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia, Implications ...

Forests and Decentralization in Indonesia: an Overview
management through extensive bureaucratic procedures such as forest management
plans, price controls, marketing and permits for cutting, transport, and processing
(Colfer 2005; Edmunds et al. 2003).” Central government officials often rationalize
such efforts to retain control on the grounds that provincial, district, and municipal
governments have limited institutional capacity and, in particular, they commonly
lack essential technical skills that are needed to ensure that forests are managed
sustainably (Mariasa and Abdillah 2001).
The problem of limited institutional capacity for forest administration at the
local level is certainly a significant concern. However, as Larson (2005) correctly
points out, it is a concern that is often cited by central government actors as a means
to justify the status quo. 2 Forest resources frequently represent an important source
of revenue for national governments which they are generally reluctant to relinquish.
In addition, state leaders often distribute timber concessions and other types of forest
permits as patronage to political elites and powerful institutions, such as the military
(Ross 2001; Barr 1998). In many countries, the prevalence of such personal and
institutional interests leads central government decision-makers to resist pressures
to devolve authority over forest resources to lower levels of government. When such
authority is devolved, the process of decentralization invariably is mediated by the
interests of individual and institutional stakeholders at multiple levels. 3
Directly related to the issue of interest is that of accountability. In many countries,
decentralization initiatives have transferred authority over key aspects of forest
administration to local governments which have little downward accountability to the
people living within their jurisdictions. In cases where local elites have been strong
and/or traditionally marginalized groups have been unable to organize themselves,
decentralization has often strengthened pre-existing power relations, rather than
promoting democratic decision-making processes (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001;
Utting 1993).Within such contexts, it is not unusual for local forestry bureaucracies
to emerge as powerful interest groups that compete with local users for control over
forest resources (Larson 2005). Competition of this sort can undermine existing forest
management institutions at the local level, and in doing so, can weaken incentives
for protecting forests or managing them sustainably. Larson (2005) argues, moreover,
that in some countries the imposition of new rules and authority over forest resources
brought about by decentralization has, in fact, been “aimed specifically at increasing
the presence of the state and its control over certain sectors of the population.”
To be effective, decentralized forest administration also generally requires some
degree of mutual accountability and operational coordination among government
agencies across political-administrative levels. At a minimum, this requires a clear
definition of roles, rights, and responsibilities for governments at each level in the
state hierarchy. It has been argued by some theorists (and many policymakers) that
even in decentralized settings, central governments have an important role to play
in administering forest resources by virtue of the expansive nature of many forest
ecosystems and their status as public goods. deGrassi (2003), for instance, argues
that central governments are “better placed to take into account scale effects, public
service obligations, and the protection of trans-boundary and trans-generational
public goods, while districts will be tempted to realize the forests’ cash value, and