Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia, Implications ...

Barr, C. et al. 129
suitable to local conditions and culture. During the early phase of decentralization, local
governments did discuss ways of streamlining government administration, restructuring
for better efficiency and provision of improved public service. Unfortunately, in the
struggle for power at the local level, Indonesia’s district governments on the whole
have not used the opportunity provided to adjust governance to local circumstances. In
general, district governments -- while closer physically to the country’s forest resources
and the communities that depend on them -- do not seem to administer forests better than
their national counterparts, nor do they always show better understanding of local needs
and aspirations. At the same time, it must be recognized that decentralization is new yet
and there has not been time for full adjustment or internalization of the new systems.
The ability of local constituencies to hold the authorities who have gained devolved
powers accountable for their decisions has been identified as a key element in successful
decentralization. Although there have been significant reforms to the electoral system,
there are still significant problems in the system of representation. In particular clientalism
within centralized party systems, money politics and the domination of unaccountable
local elites have clouded the implementation of regional autonomy.
In the meantime, the decentralization processes in Indonesia are plagued by increasing
disconnects, enlarging the reality gap between what policy makers at the national level
believe is happening and how local people experience it. The system on the ground
is disconnected from the formal legal system, both at the national and district level.
National level policies are often ignored or distorted, and always reinterpreted during
implementation at district level. Although not new, with decentralization and local
control, the disjuncture has grown wider.
With regard to tenure, decentralization has irrevocably changed local perceptions
and value of forests and other natural resources, especially in regions where these
resources have high economic value. This change is primarily indicated by the increasing
conflict over resource access and ownership, and increasing demands for local rights.
Increasingly, local stakeholders are asking why district governments did not use
decentralization as an opportunity to re-regulate forest and land tenure, and to formalize
adat systems for forest access and management.
As mentioned earlier, authority over spatial planning and the setting of forestry
boundaries were not devolved to the districts under Indonesia’s decentralization laws.
This meant that district governments did not have significant authority over tenurial
issues within the Forestry Estate. At the same time conflicts due to unclear or overlapping
property rights have been a frequent occurrence. In general, the government has managed
to suppress these, at times with force. For national policymakers, it is perhaps much
easier to believe that human resources at the community level are weak and, therefore,
state control over resources and statutory law are needed to regulate property rights.
Furthermore, there is little incentive for districts to regulate tenure, especially in favor
of local people. As long as land and forest resources are still controlled by the state, it
is much simpler for the districts to justify their exploitation of these resources for local
revenue.
The role of district governments in decision-making with respect to forests has
decreased with the swing back to more centralized administration of forests since 2002.
There are signs that this recentralization process could also result in further disputes
over land tenure and forest access. Recently, for instance, the Ministry of Forestry has