Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia, Implications ...

130
Decentralization and Recentralization in Indonesia’s Forestry Sector
set a target of increasing Indonesia’s industrial timber plantations from 2.5 million ha in
2005 to 5.0 million by 2009. In many cases, plantation development is likely to catalyze
or exacerbate disputes with local communities who claim adat rights in these areas.
As land tenure is a fundamental element of any social structure, re-regulating tenure
cannot be easy, especially when so many parties are involved. The large number of
ethnic groups alone makes it almost impossible to decide which party has more rights
than others. It may be in the interest of district governments to maintain multiple levels
of ambiguity to allocate land in ways that they judge most important and that meet their
own interests (Wollenberg et al. 2006). Any legalization of others’ rights would detract
from the district’s opportunities for control. Since formalization would result in winners
and losers, district officials are often also wisely wary of the possibilities of increased
ethnic strife and a decline in political support from key groups.
However, given the general lack of coordination across levels, it is unclear as to
who is then responsible for guaranteeing the security of land and forest tenure. While
it is commonly accepted and believed that the government at each level is ultimately
responsible for doing so, most government agencies have shown little desire to regulate
or provide security of tenure.
The lack of a clear division of authority, coupled with inconsistent regulations
which are not enforced, has resulted in an intense free-for-all competition over forests
and other natural resources. Together with the lack of long-term vision on the part of
government actors at each level, decisions are made based on short-term benefits rather
than long-term strategies. At the local level, confusion over rules has frequently enabled
village elites to control access to forests and to capture many of the benefits from forests,
causing the marginalization of weaker parties. Although since decentralization, local
communities’ right to obtain a share in benefits is no longer disputed, their relatively
weak legal bargaining power has allowed more powerful parties to reap more.
Many civil society groups have argued that communities should have responsibilities
for regulating their own property rights just as they had in the past. However, in the current
situation of uncertainty, devolving tenure regulations to local and adat communities is
also not a straightforward process. In many cases, decentralization has encouraged adat
communities to be very exclusive in managing access to forests, which in turn has raised
concerns among other actors or communities who previously shared access to those
forests. Further, in the absence of clear forms of accountability in many communities,
adat communities are not necessarily more equitable than other types of social groups.
However, unless the rights of adat peoples are also recognized by other groups, everyone’s
tenure remains insecure.
In some communities, it is also the case that adat leaders have been co-opted by
government agencies or private sector actors. In some cases, local leaders have learned to
expect government honoraria as their rights, where privileges have been transformed into
entitlements. While on the surface decentralization would appear to have strengthened
adat, when it is used in this way, it can also have the effect of disempowering adat. For
example, recognition of adat claims often means that a company with logging rights pays
compensation, fees or fines to local community groups. The payment of compensation
and fines, however, is often interpreted to mean that customary rules might be broken on
a routine basis as long as cash payments are made.