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Decentralization of Forest Administration in Indonesia, Implications ...

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118<br />

The Impacts <strong>of</strong> <strong>Decentralization</strong> on Tenure and Livelihoods<br />

Although local communities have <strong>of</strong>ten obta<strong>in</strong>ed an <strong>in</strong>creased share <strong>of</strong> the benefits from<br />

forest exploitation under decentralization, partnerships between communities and outside<br />

<strong>in</strong>vestors generally have not distributes these benefits equitably among the poorest<br />

community members. Rather, the pr<strong>of</strong>its from district timber and forest conversion permits<br />

have largely gone to entrepreneurs, elites and government <strong>of</strong>ficers. More generally, a<br />

lack <strong>of</strong> effective law enforcement and control over the activities <strong>of</strong> timber, m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g, and<br />

plantation companies has <strong>of</strong>ten led to environment degradation, which eventually affects<br />

the people who most depend on forests for their livelihoods. Some community members<br />

have received a small share <strong>of</strong> the pr<strong>of</strong>its from HPHH and IPPK permits. However, there<br />

has <strong>of</strong>ten been a lack <strong>of</strong> transparency <strong>in</strong> the distribution <strong>of</strong> thse benefits with<strong>in</strong> villages,<br />

and marg<strong>in</strong>alized groups, <strong>in</strong>clud<strong>in</strong>g women and ethnic m<strong>in</strong>orities, have frequently not<br />

received an equitable share (Yasmi et al. 2005). In villages surveyed <strong>in</strong> Mal<strong>in</strong>au (East<br />

Kalimantan), community members perceived IPPK fee payments as either not be<strong>in</strong>g<br />

fairly distributed or hav<strong>in</strong>g not been received at all (Palmer 2004).<br />

Job creation <strong>in</strong> forested regions is another positive outcome that successful<br />

decentralization might have <strong>of</strong>fered. However, it is not clear that this has been the case on<br />

any large scale <strong>in</strong> <strong>Indonesia</strong>’s forestry sector. In Manokwari, for <strong>in</strong>stance, decentralization<br />

has opened a limited space for job creation, although one might question its susta<strong>in</strong>ability.<br />

S<strong>in</strong>ce they lack skills, the jobs are limited to guid<strong>in</strong>g logg<strong>in</strong>g teams and/or load<strong>in</strong>g and<br />

unload<strong>in</strong>g timber, which are poorly paid (Tokede et al. 2005). In one research study <strong>in</strong><br />

Mal<strong>in</strong>au, none <strong>of</strong> the local villagers was <strong>of</strong>fered jobs with the companies engaged <strong>in</strong><br />

harvest<strong>in</strong>g timber under IPPK permits, apparently because villagers <strong>in</strong> those locations had<br />

no previous experience work<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> logg<strong>in</strong>g operations. Instead, all the IPPK workers were<br />

contracted from outside the area (Palmer 2004).<br />

F<strong>in</strong>ally, even the money that has been received by local communities under timber<br />

harvest<strong>in</strong>g agreements with outside companies or <strong>in</strong>vestors has not always been used<br />

to support last<strong>in</strong>g improvements <strong>in</strong> community welfare. In Manokwari, for <strong>in</strong>stance,<br />

members <strong>of</strong> surveyed communities considered the compensation from timber harvest<strong>in</strong>g<br />

to be a w<strong>in</strong>dfall, and they eventually used the money ma<strong>in</strong>ly for consumption goods<br />

(Tokede et al. 2005).<br />

6.7 Trends?<br />

<strong>Indonesia</strong>’s ostensible transition is <strong>in</strong>dicative <strong>of</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternational community’s global<br />

push for decentralized governance, although for the most part decentralized governance<br />

has not been implemented successfully (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Agrawal and Ribot<br />

(1999) suggest that the success <strong>of</strong> any decentralization program requires the follow<strong>in</strong>g<br />

three <strong>in</strong>terconnected steps:<br />

• the management <strong>of</strong> political relationships at the level <strong>of</strong> the central state so that some<br />

powerful actors at that level become committed to pursu<strong>in</strong>g decentralization;<br />

• the creation <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>stitutional mechanisms at the level <strong>of</strong> the locality that prevent elite<br />

actors at that level from corner<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>creased flow <strong>of</strong> benefits directed toward lower<br />

levels <strong>of</strong> governance and adm<strong>in</strong>istration; and<br />

• the management <strong>of</strong> flows <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>formation and creation <strong>of</strong> capacities so that the new<br />

<strong>in</strong>formation is used appropriately to produce goods and services for people.

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