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Probabilistic Performance Analysis of Fault Diagnosis Schemes

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let c i be the cost <strong>of</strong> implementing the system G (i )<br />

θ<br />

with the scheme V (i ) , for all i . A<br />

trade study examines the trade-<strong>of</strong>f between the cost c i and the performance <strong>of</strong> the<br />

scheme V (i ) , with respect to the system G (i )<br />

)<br />

, for each i . For example, each system G(i<br />

θ θ<br />

may consist <strong>of</strong> a different combination <strong>of</strong> sensors and components, in which case<br />

a trade study may be used to decide if it is more beneficial, from a fault diagnosis<br />

standpoint, to use higher-quality components or to use redundant copies <strong>of</strong> a lowerquality<br />

component. In addition to size, weight, and monetary costs, c i may also<br />

include a measure <strong>of</strong> how difficult it is to compute the performance metrics for the<br />

fault diagnosis problem given by G (i )<br />

θ and V (i ) .<br />

3. Certifying system safety: Suppose that when a fault is detected, the system G θ and<br />

the fault diagnosis scheme V are reconfigured, as in Section 4.4.2. Recall that in<br />

Section 4.4.2, we showed that<br />

Ĵ k (i , j ) = P( ˆD j,k ∩ H i ,k )<br />

is the probability <strong>of</strong> the system being in configuration s j when it should be in configuration<br />

s j . Note that for some (i , j ) pairs, the event ˆD j,k ∩ H i ,k is safe, while for other<br />

pairs it is not. For example, it is safe to be in the nominal mode when no faults have<br />

occurred, but it is unsafe to be in the nominal mode when a critical sensor has failed.<br />

Therefore, by computing and analyzing the matrices {Ĵ k }, we can quantitatively certify<br />

that the probability that system is in a safe configuration, at time k, is within some<br />

acceptable range [1 − α,1].<br />

6.3 Air-Data Sensor Example<br />

Nearly all aircraft use a pitot-static probe to determine airspeed V and altitude h. Because<br />

these data are essential for flying, the pitot-static probe is integrated into the flight control<br />

feedback loop. These sensors are prone to a number <strong>of</strong> failures, such as icing and blockage,<br />

that cause them to produce incorrect values. If such a failure goes undetected, the autopilot<br />

system or the pilot may use the erroneous values to issue commands that cause the aircraft<br />

to crash. To avoid such disasters, large commercial aircraft, such as the Boeing 777 [103,104],<br />

have multiple pitot-static probes in different locations. However, most aircraft designers<br />

have developed a set <strong>of</strong> standard operating procedures that allow safe recovery <strong>of</strong> the aircraft<br />

when a pitot-static probe failure is detected [6]. In this application we explore the detection<br />

<strong>of</strong> such faults by exploiting the analytical redundancy between airspeed, altitude, and flight<br />

path angle. This example was also studied less extensively in the conference papers [97, 98].<br />

101

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