ENERGY FOR A SUSTAINABLE WORLD - World Resources Institute

These "threshold" countries are not likely to
oppose further proliferation of nuclear weapons
or to support far-reaching international controls
over nuclear power as long as the current nonproliferation
system remains so discriminatory.
A country that formally renounces nuclear
weapons can be seen as accepting a fundamental
restriction on its political independence,
condemned to neocolonial status with respect
to the superpowers. As a result, under the
present ground rules, there seems no prospect
of widening support for the NPT.
Even more serious, the groundwork for
reprocessing and recycling plutonium in the industrialized
countries has already created demand
for these technologies in Argentina,
Brazil, Pakistan, South Korea, Taiwan, and
elsewhere, including several countries that
have ratified the NPT. 66 Such a demand is inspired
by a combination of technical considerations,
desires for prestige, and military
motives. Their many-sided character is what
makes the plutonium fuel cycle technologies so
troublesome: nations can move step-by-step
toward a weapons capability without having to
decide or announce their ultimate intentions in
advance. This "latent proliferation" undermines
the effectiveness of present nuclear
safeguards.
Latent proliferation is not significantly constrained
by the NPT because the treaty permits
the development of all types of civilian nuclear
power facilities without discrimination. In fact,
under Article IV, parties to the treaty agree to
facilitate the "fullest possible" exchange of
equipment, materials, and information for the
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Even countries
that have ratified the NPT are moving closer to
the technical capability to produce nuclear
weapons. Under extraordinary circumstances,
they could withdraw from the treaty on
relatively short notice.
End-use energy strategies can provide the
basis for formulating a more hopeful nonproliferation
policy that also makes economic
sense—as is indicated by considerations of the
proliferation risks and economic aspects of different
parts of the nuclear fuel cycle.
As long as plutonium remains in spent fuel,
it is protected against diversion to weapons
purposes by the intense radiation from the fuel
elements. Plutonium can be separated only by
reprocessing the spent fuel, and there are no
sound reasons for doing so at present. 67 Reprocessing
spent fuel to recover the plutonium for
recycling in today's reactors is uneconomical,
and there is no need to reprocess spent fuel for
breeder reactors (which require plutonium as
fuel).
Even if nuclear power grows moderately
rapidly, the world's nuclear power systems
would not be constrained by limited supplies
of uranium for at least 50 years. 68 The need for
plutonium recycling and breeder reactors
would be far less with the nuclear power
scenario we have described. (See Chapter III.)
Finally, the argument that the disposal of
nuclear power wastes requires reprocessing
does not stand up to critical analysis. There appear
to be no inherent problems with direct
spent-fuel disposal, though no satisfactory
long-term waste disposal scheme has yet been
developed for either spent fuel or reprocessed
fuel. 69
An important policy option for reducing the
risk of proliferation would be to avoid reprocessing
spent fuel. Imposing such a constraint
on non-nuclear weapons countries, whether
NPT signatories or not, would be possible only
if the nuclear weapons countries engaged in
the vertical proliferation of nuclear weaponry
accepted parallel obligations—certainly on their
civilian power programs but perhaps also on
their weapons programs, because the problems
of horizontal and vertical proliferation of
nuclear weapons are inevitably, intimately, and
inextricably linked. A global policy to avoid
reprocessing spent fuel from civilian power
programs (implemented through an international
agreement) might have to be supplemented
by a policy (agreed to by the nuclear
107