Promoting IDPs' and Women's Voices in Post-Conflict Georgia

disregarded. Although the State Strategy was first approved in 2007, it was the humanitarian crisisinvolving 20,000 new IDPs from South Ossetia after the war in 2008 that first catalyzed thegovernment’s efforts to provide IDPs with durable housing solutions. In an “unprecedented steptowards…durable resettlement and viable integration,” 243 the government constructed settlements forthis new wave of IDPs. In addition, about 4,000 IDP families have received refurbished or purchasedapartments or financial compensation of $10,000, for those who reject the housing offer. 244 About18,000 IDPs, or 90% of the new wave, have thus received assistance. 245For old wave IDPs, the MRA has constructed apartment blocks in “economically viable and fast-growingareas,” 246 such as Poti, Zugdidi, Tskaltubo, and Batumi. These accommodations are offered as alternativehousing for IDPs living in collective centers. These buildings are not offered to them for privatizationbecause they are either too dilapidated to be rehabilitated or are of interest to the state for sale toprivate investors or for another purpose. 247While the government has clearly made significant strides in providing resettlement options for both oldand new wave IDPs, they have done so with minimal consultation of IDPs. No application processoccurred for receiving this housing, and visits to their possible new homes were only rarely organizedbefore IDPs were relocated. 248 The allocation process also lacked transparency. According to a UNHCRrepresentative, it is not clear how IDPs are selected for resettlement. The process is based on guidelines,not a law, which makes it difficult to lodge complaints. She suggested that in reality, MRA officials seemto arrive at collective centers and present the option to move as if it is IDPs’ only opportunity to receivegovernment assistance. 249 Another INGO representative offered another perspective on this issue,stating that IDPs have three opportunities to accept the government’s offers. 250 Either way, a lack ofinformation seems to continue to plague IDPs as they are also unaware of the eligibility requirementsfor resettlement.Evictions from collective centers also present a clear example of the lack of consultation and choice thatIDPs have had in the resettlement process. The three waves of evictions in June 2010, January 2011, andJuly 2011 have involved significant controversy, as IDPs received notification days and sometimes justhours in advance. A number of IDPs from Tbilisi were faced only with the option of moving to rural areaswhere they lacked job opportunities and access to schools and medical care. IDPs experienced limitedchoice in the matter and also have limited tenure over their new dwellings. Data on the total number ofIDPs who accepted resettlement was not available, nor has systematic monitoring occurred of the243 Transparency International Georgia, “Cottage Settlements for Georgia's New IDPs: Accountability in Aid and Construction,”27 April 2010, 15.244 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees, “Durable HousingStrategy as a part of the Action Plan for implementation of the State Strategy.”245 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 146.246 Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons from the Occupied Territories, Accommodation and Refugees, “Durable HousingStrategy as a part of the Action Plan for implementation of the State Strategy.”247 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 87.248 Ibid., 84.249 International Organization Representative, Personal Interview, 19 March 2012.250 Mzevi Jojua, Personal Interview.50