rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

142 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICHwas away from Berlin electioneering, but Groener, who received the delegates inhis capacity of Minister of the Interior and of Defense, promised action as soonas Bruening returned, which was on April 10, the day of the second election.Bruening and Groener thought they had good reasons for stamping out the S.A.It would end the threat of civil war and might be a prelude to the end of Hitleras a major factor in German politics. Certain of Hindenburg’s re-election byan absolute majority, they felt that the voters were giving them a mandate toprotect the Republic against the threats of the Nazis to forcibly overthrow it.The time had come to use force against force. Also, unless they acted vigorously,the government would lose the support of the Social Democrats and the tradeunions, which were providing most of the votes for Hindenburg and the chiefbacking for the continuance of Bruening’s government.The cabinet met on April 10, in the midst of the polling, and decided to immediatelysuppress Hitler’s private armies. There was some difficulty in gettingHindenburg to sign the decree – Schleicher, who had first approved it, began towhisper objections in the President’s ear – but he finally did so on April 13 andit was promulgated on April 14.This was a stunning blow to the Nazis. Roehm and some of the hotheadsin the party urged resistance to the order. But Hitler, shrewder than his lieutenants,ruled that it must be obeyed. This was no moment for armed rebellion.Besides, there was interesting news about Schleicher. Goebbels noted it in hisdiary on that very day, April 14: ”We are informed that Schleicher does notapprove Groener’s action . . . ” And later that day: ”. . . a telephone call froma well-known lady who is a close friend of General Schleicher. She says theGeneral wants to resign.” 150Goebbels was interested but skeptical. ”Perhaps,” he added, ”it is only amaneuver.” Neither he nor Hitler nor anyone else, certainly not Bruening andmost certainly not Groener, to whom Schleicher owed his rapid rise in the Armyand in the councils of government, had as yet surmised the infinite capacity fortreachery of the scheming political General. But they were soon to learn.Even before the ban on the S.A. was promulgated, Schleicher, who had wonover the weak-minded commander of the Reichswehr, General von Hammerstein,confidentially informed the commanders of the seven military districts that theArmy opposed the move. Next he persuaded Hindenburg to write a cantankerousletter to Groener, on April 16, asking why the Reichsbanner, the paramilitaryorganization of the Social Democrats, had not been suppressed along withthe S.A, Schleicher took a further step to undermine his chiefs position. Heinspired a malicious smear campaign against General Groener, spreading talesthat he was too ill to remain in office, that he had become a convert to Marxismand even to pacifism and proclaiming that the Defense Minister had disgracedthe Army by having a child born five months after his recent marriage – thebaby, he told Hindenburg, had been nicknamed ”Nurmi” in Army circles, afterthe fleet Finnish runner of Olympic fame.In the meantime, Schleicher renewed his contacts with the S.A. He held talkswith both Roehm, the S.A. chief, and Count von Helldorf, the S.A. leader ofBerlin. On April 26, Goebbels noted that Schleicher had informed Helldorffhe ”wanted to change his course.” Two days later Schleicher saw Hitler, andGoebbels reported that ”the talk went off well.”Even at this stage of the game it is evident that with regard to one questionRoehm and Schleicher were conspiring behind Hitler’s back. Both men wanted