rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

496 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICHthe substance: It is already too late to go back on the Germans . . .The press of the whole world would say that Italy is cowardly . . . Itry to debate the matter but it is useless now. Mussolini holds verystubbornly to his idea . . .August 21. – Today I have spoken very clearly . . . When I enteredthe room Mussolini confirmed his decision to go along with the Germans.”You, Duce, cannot and must not do it . . . I went to Salzburgin order to adopt a common line of action. I found myself face toface with a Diktat. The Germans, not ourselves, have betrayed thealliance . . . Tear up the pact. Throw it in Hitler’s face! . . . ”The upshot of this conference was that Ciano should seek a meeting withRibbentrop for the next day at the Brenner and inform him that Italy wouldstay out of a conflict provoked by a German attack on Poland. Ribbentrop wasnot available for several hours when Ciano put in a call for him at noon, butat 5:30 he finally came on the line. The Nazi Foreign Minister could not giveCiano an immediate answer about meeting on the Brenner on such quick notice,because he was ”waiting for an important message from Moscow” and wouldcall back later. This he did at 10:30 P.M.August 22. – Last evening at 10:30 a new act opened [Ciano recordedin his diary]. Ribbentrop telephoned that he would prefer to see mein Innsbruck rather than at the frontier, because he was to leave laterfor Moscow to sign a political pact with the Soviet Government.This was news, and of the most startling kind, to Ciano and Mussolini. Theydecided that a meeting of the two foreign ministers ”would no longer be timely.”Once more their German ally had shown its contempt for them by not lettingthem know about the deal with Moscow.The hesitations of the Duce, the anti-German feelings of Ciano and thepossibility that Italy might, crawl out of its obligations under Article III of thePact of Steel, which called for the automatic participation in war of one partyif the other party ”became involved in hostilities with another Power,” becameknown in Berlin before Ribbentrop set off for Moscow on August 22.On August 20, Count Massimo Magistrall, the Italian charge d’affaires inBerlin, called on Weizsaecker at the Foreign Office and revealed ”an Italian stateof mind which, although it does not surprise me,” the State Secretary informedRibbentrop in a confidential memorandum, 614 ”must in my opinion definitely beconsidered.” What Magistrall brought to the attention of Weizsaecker was thatsince Germany had not adhered to the terms of the alliance, which called forclose contact and consultation on major questions, and had treated its conflictwith Poland as an exclusively German problem, ”Germany was thus forgoingItaly’s armed assistance.” And if contrary to the German view the Polish conflictdeveloped into a big war, Italy did not consider that the ”prerequisites” of thealliance existed. In brief, Italy was seeking an out.Two days later, on August 23, a further warning was received in Berlin fromAmbassador Hans Georg von Mackensen in Rome. He wrote to Weizsaeckeron what had been happening ”behind the scenes.” The letter, according to amarginal note in Weizsaecker’s handwriting on the captured document, was”submitted to the Fuehrer.” It must have opened his eyes. The Italian position,following a series of meetings between Mussolini, Ciano and Attolico, was,