rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

736 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICHlast enemy remaining on the Continent before coming to grips with Britain.”From now on to the bitter end he would stick fanatically to this fundamentalstrategy.As a sop to his naval chief, Hitler promised to ”try once more to influenceFranco” so that the attack against Gibraltar could be made and the Mediterraneanclosed to the British fleet. Actually, he had already dropped the wholeidea. On December 11 he had quietly ordered, ”Operation Felix will not becarried out as the political conditions no longer exist.” Nagged by his own Navyand by the Italians to keep after Franco, Hitler made one final effort, thoughit was painful to him. On February 6, 1941, he addressed a long letter to theSpanish dictator.. . . About one thing, Caudillo, there must be clarity: we are fightinga battle of life and death and cannot at this time make any gifts . . .The battle which Germany and Italy are fighting will determine thedestiny of Spain as well. Only in the case of our victory will yourpresent regime continue to exist. 984Unfortunately for the Axis, the letter reached the Caudillo on the very daythat Marshal Graziani’s last forces in Cyrenaica had been wiped out by theBritish south of Benghazi. Little wonder that when Franco got around to replying– on February 26, 1941 – though protesting his ”absolute loyalty” tothe Axis, he reminded the Nazi leader that recent developments had left ”thecircumstances of October far behind” and that their understanding of that timehad become ”outmoded.”For one of the very few times in his stormy life, Adolf Hitler conceded defeat.”The long and short of the tedious Spanish rigmarole,” he wrote Mussolini, ”isthat Spain does not want to enter the war and will not enter it. This is extremelytiresome since it means that for the moment the possibility of striking at Britainin the simplest manner, in her Mediterranean possessions, is eliminated.”Italy, not Spain, however, was the key to defeating Britain in the Mediterranean,but the Duce’s creaky empire was not equal to the task of doing italone and Hitler was not wise enough to give her the means, which he had, toaccomplish it. The possibility of striking at Britain either directly across theChannel or indirectly across the broader Mediterranean, he now confessed, hadbeen eliminated ”for the moment.” Though this was frustrating, the acknowledgmentof it brought Hitler relief. He could now turn to matters nearer hisheart and mind.On January 8-9, 1941, he held a council of war at the Berghof above Berchtesgaden,which now lay deep in the winter’s snow. The mountain air seems tohave cleared his mind, and once more, as the lengthy confidential reports ofthe meeting by Admiral Raeder and General Haider 985 disclose, his thoughtsranged far and wide as he outlined his grand strategy to his military chiefs. Hisoptimism had returned.The Fuehrer [Raeder noted] is firmly convinced that the situation in Europecan no longer develop unfavorably for Germany even if we should lose the wholeof North Africa. Our position in Europe is so firmly established that the outcomecannot possibly be to our disadvantage . . . The British can hope to win thewar only by beating us on the Continent. The Fuehrer is convinced that this isimpossible.