rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

THE LAST DAYS OF PEACE 497Mackensen reported, that if Germany invaded Poland she would violate thePact of Steel, which was based on an agreement to refrain from war until 1942.Furthermore, contrary to the German view, Mussolini was sure that if Germanyattacked Poland both Britain and France would intervene – ”and the UnitedStates too after a few months.” While Germany remained on the defensive inthe west the French and British,in the Duce’s opinion, would descend on Italy with all the forcesat their disposal. In this, situation Italy would have to bear thewhole brunt of the war in order to give the Reich the opportunity ofliquidating the affair in the East . . . 615It was with these warnings in mind that Hitler got off his letter to Mussolinion the morning of August 25 and waited all day, with mounting impatience,for an answer. Shortly after midnight of the day before, Ribbentrop, after anevening recounting to the Fuehrer the details of his triumph in Moscow, rang upCiano to warn him, ”at the instigation of the Fuehrer,” of the ”extreme gravityof the situation due to Polish provocations.” ∗ A note by Weizsaecker revealsthat the call was made to ”prevent the Italians from being able to speak ofunexpected developments.”By the time Ambassador Mackensen handed Mussolini Hitler’s letter at thePalazzo Venezia in Rome at 3:20 P.M. on August 25, the Duce, then, knewthat the German attack on Poland was about to take place. Unlike Hitler, hewas certain that Great Britain and France would immediately enter the war,with catastrophic consequences for Italy, whose Navy was no match for theBritish Mediterranean Fleet and whose Army would be overwhelmed by theFrench. † According to a dispatch which Mackensen got off to Berlin at 10:25P.M. describing the meeting, Mussolini, after carefully reading the letter twicein his presence, declared that he was ”in complete agreement” about the Nazi-Soviet Pact and that he realized that an ”armed conflict with Poland could nolonger be avoided.” Finally – ”and this he emphasized expressly,” Mackensenreported – ”he stood beside us unconditionally and with all his resources.” 616But this was not what the Duce wrote the Fuehrer, unbeknownst to theGerman ambassador, the text of which was hurriedly telephoned by Ciano toAttolico, who had returned to his post in Berlin and who ”about 6 P.M.” arrivedat the Chancellery to deliver it in person to Adolf Hitler.It struck the Fuehrer, according to Schmidt, who was present, like a bombshell.After expressing his ”complete approval” of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and his”understanding concerning Poland,” Mussolini came to the main point.∗ It must be kept in mind that the ”Polish provocations” which Hitler and Ribbentropharped on in their meetings and diplomatic exchanges with the British, French, Russians andItalians during these days, and the news of which was published under flaming headlines in thecontrolled Nazi press, were almost entirely invented by the Germans. Most of the provoking inPoland was done, on orders from Berlin, by the Germans. The captured German documentsare replete with evidence on this.† The day before, on August 24, Ciano had visited the King at his summer residence inPiedmont, and the aging ruler, who had been shunted to the sidelines by Mussolini, spokecontemptuously of the country’s armed services. ”The Army is in a pitiful state,” Cianoquotes him as saying. ”Even the defense of our frontier is insufficient. He has made thirty-twoinspections and is convinced that the French can go through it with great ease. The officers ofthe Italian Army are not qualified for the job, and our equipment is old and obsolete.” (CianoDiaries, p. 127.)