rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

THE LAST DAYS OF THE REPUBLIC 1931-33 153nearly a million additional votes – obviously from the Nazis – and now had 52seats instead of 37. Though the National Socialists were still the largest partyin the country, the loss of two million votes was a severe setback. For the firsttime the great Nazi tide was ebbing, and from a point far short of a majority.The legend of invincibility had been shattered. Hitler was in a weaker positionto bargain for power than he had been since July.Realizing this, Papen put aside what he calls his ”personal distaste” forHitler and wrote him a letter on November 13 inviting him to ”discuss the situation.”But Hitler made so many conditions in his reply that Papen abandonedall hope of obtaining an understanding with him. The Nazi leader’s intransigencedid not surprise the breezy, incompetent Chancellor, but a new coursewhich his friend and mentor, Schleicher, now proposed did surprise him. Forthe slippery kingmaker had come to the conclusion that Papen’s usefulness, likethat of Bruening before him, had come to an end. New plans were sproutingin his fertile mind. His good friend Papen must go. The President must be leftcompletely free to deal with the political parties, especially with the largest. Heurged Papen’s resignation, and on November 17 Papen and his cabinet resigned.Hindenburg sent immediately for Hitler.Their meeting on November 19 was less frigid than that of August 13. Thistime the President offered chairs and allowed his caller to remain for over anhour. Hindenburg presented Hitler with two choices: the chancellorship if hecould secure a workable majority in the Reichstag for a definite program, or thevice-chancellorship under Papen in another presidential cabinet that would ruleby emergency decrees. Hitler saw the President again on the twenty-first andhe also exchanged several letters with Meissner. But there was no agreement.Hitler could not get a workable majority in Parliament. Though the CenterParty agreed to support him on condition that he would not aspire to dictatorship,Hugenberg withheld the co-operation of the Nationalists. Hitler thereforeresumed his demand for the chancellorship of a presidential government, butthis the President would not give him. If there was to be a cabinet governingby decree Hindenburg preferred his friend Papen to head it. Hitler, he said ina letter on his behalf dispatched by Meissner, could not be given such a post”because such a cabinet is bound to develop into a party dictatorship. . . . Icannot take the responsibility for this before my oath and my conscience.” 157The old Field Marshal was more prophetic on the first point than on thesecond. As for Hitler, once more he had knocked on the door of the Chancellery,had seen it open a crack only to be slammed shut in his face.This was just what Papen had expected, and when he and Schleicher wentto see Hindenburg on the evening of December 1 he was sure that he would bereappointed Chancellor. Little did he suspect what the scheming General hadbeen up to. Schleicher had been in touch with Strasser and had suggested thatif the Nazis would not come into a Papen government perhaps they would join acabinet in which he himself were Chancellor. Hitler was asked to come to Berlinfor consultations with the General, and according to one version widely publicizedin the German press and later accepted by most historians, the Fuehreractually took the night train to Berlin from Munich but was hauled off in thedead of the night by Goering at Jena and spirited away to Weimar for a meetingof the top Nazi leaders. Actually the Nazi version of this incident is, surprisingly,probably the more accurate. Goebbels’ diary for November 30 recountsthat a telegram came for Hitler asking him to hurry to Berlin, but that he de-