rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

THE LAST DAYS OF PEACE 515give him the glad tidings. Not only to do that but – such had his positionbecome, at least in his own mind – to advise the British government what tosay in its official reply. That note, which Henderson would be bringing later onthis Monday, August 28, must contain an undertaking, Dahlerus emphasized,that Britain would persuade Poland to negotiate with Germany directly andimmediately.Dahlerus has just telephoned [read a later dispatch from Forbes onAugust 28] from Goering’s office following suggestions which he considersmost important.1. British reply to Hitler should not contain any reference to Rooseveltplan. ∗2. Hitler suspects Poles will try to avoid negotiations. Replyshould therefore contain clear statement that the Poles havebeen strongly advised to immediately establish contact withGermany and negotiate. †646Throughout the day the now confident Swede not only heaped advice onForbes, who dutifully wired it to London, but himself telephoned the BritishForeign Office with a message for Halifax containing further suggestions.At this critical moment in world history the amateur Swedish diplomat hadindeed become the pivotal point between Berlin and London. At 2 P.M. onAugust 28, Halifax, who had been apprised both from his Berlin embassy andfrom Dahlerus’ telephone call to the Foreign Office of the Swede’s urgent advice,wired the British ambassador in Warsaw, Sir Howard Kennard, to see ForeignMinister Beck ”at once” and get him to authorize the British government toinform Hitler ”that Poland is ready to enter at once into direct discussion withGermany.” The Foreign Secretary was in a hurry. He wanted to include theauthorization in the official reply to Hitler which Henderson was waiting to carryback to Berlin this same day. He urged his ambassador in Warsaw to telephoneBeck’s reply. Late in the afternoon Beck gave the requested authorization andit was hastily inserted in the British note. 647Henderson arrived back in Berlin with it on the evening of August 28, and afterbeing received at the Chancellery by an S.S. guard of honor, which presentedarms and rolled its drums (the formal diplomatic pretensions were preserved tothe end), he was ushered into the presence of Hitler, to whom he handed aGerman translation of the note, at 10:30 P.M. The Chancellor read it at once.The British government ”entirely agreed” with him, the communication said,that there must ”first” be a settlement of the differences between Germanyand Poland. ”Everything, however,” it added, ”turns upon the nature of thesettlement and the method by which it is to be reached.” On this matter, thenote said, the Chancellor had been ”silent.” Hitler’s offer to ”guarantee” theBritish Empire was gently declined. The British government ”could not, for∗ Presumably President Roosevelt’s message to Hitler on August 24 and 25 urging directnegotiations between Germany and Poland.† Dahlerus, it must be pointed out in all fairness, was not so pro-German as some of hismessages seem to imply. On the night of this same Monday, after two hours with Goering atLuftwaffe headquarters at Oranienburg, he rang up Forbes to tell him, ”German Army willbe in final position of attack on Poland during night of Wednesday-Thursday, August 30-31.”Forbes got this intelligence off to London as quickly as possible.