rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

480 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICHContrary to a widespread belief at the time, not only in Moscow but inthe Western capitals, that the British and French governments did nothing toinduce the Poles to agree to Soviet troops meeting the Germans on Polish soil,it is clear from documents recently released that London and Paris went quitefar – but not quite far enough. It is also clear that the Poles reacted withunbelievable stupidity. 597On August 18, after the first Anglo-French attempt was made in Warsawto open the eyes of the Poles, Foreign Minister Beck told the French ambassador,Leon Noel, that the Russians were ”of no military value,” and GeneralStachiewicz, Chief of the Polish General Staff, backed him up by declaring thathe saw ”no benefit to be gained by Red Army troops operating in Poland.”The next day both the British and French ambassadors saw Beck againand urged him to agree to the Russian proposal. The Polish Foreign Ministerstalled, but promised to give them a formal reply the next day. The Anglo-French demarche in Warsaw came as the result of a conversation earlier onthe nineteenth in Paris between Bonnet, the French Foreign Minister, and theBritish charge d’affaires. Somewhat to the Briton’s surprise, this archappeaserof Hitler was now quite aroused at the prospect of losing Russia as an allybecause of Polish stubbornness.It would be disastrous [Bonnet told him] if, in consequence of aPolish refusal, the Russian negotiations were to break down . . . Itwas an untenable position for the Poles to take up in refusing theonly immediate efficacious help that could reach them in the event ofa German attack. It would put the British and French Governmentsin an almost impossible position if we had to ask our respectivecountries to go to war in defense of Poland, which had refused thishelp.If this were so – and there is no doubt that it was – why then did notthe British and French governments at this crucial moment put the ultimatepressure on Warsaw and simply say that unless the Polish government agreedto accept Russian help Britain and France could see no use of themselves goingto war to aid Poland? The formal Anglo-Polish mutual-security treaty had notyet been signed. Could Warsaw’s acceptance of Russian military backing notbe made a condition of concluding that pact? ∗In his talk with the British charge in Paris on August 19, Bonnet suggestedthis, but the government in London frowned upon such a ”maneuver,” as DowningStreet called it. To such an extreme Chamberlain and Halifax would notgo.On the morning of August 20 the Polish Chief of Staff informed the Britishmilitary attache in Warsaw that ”in no case would the admission of Soviet∗ Lloyd George, in a speech in the Commons on April 3, four days after Chamberlain’sunilateral guarantee to Poland had been announced, had urged the British government tomake such a condition. ”If we are going in without the help of Russia we are walking into atrap. It is the only country whose armies can get there [to Poland]. . . . I cannot understandwhy, before committing ourselves to this tremendous enterprise, we did not secure beforehandthe adhesion of Russia . . . If Russia has not been brought into this matter because of certainfeelings the Poles have that they do not want the Russians there, it is for us to declare theconditions, and unless the Poles are prepared to accept the only conditions with which we cansuccessfully help them, the responsibility must be theirs.”