rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

606 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICHtestified at Nuremberg, with letters suggesting ”the importance of an occupationof the Norwegian coast by Germany.” 800 Raeder needed little urging and onOctober 3, at the end of the Polish campaign, sent a confidential questionnaireto the Naval War Staff asking it to ascertain the possibility of gaining ”basesin Norway under the combined pressure of Russia and Germany.” Ribbentropwas consulted about Moscow’s attitude and replied that ”far-reaching supportmay be expected” from that source. Raeder told his staff that Hitler must beinformed as soon as possible about the ”possibilities.” 801On October 10, in the course of a lengthy report to the Fuehrer on navaloperations, Raeder suggested the importance of obtaining naval bases in Norway,if necessary with the help of Russia. This – so far as the confidential records show– was the first time the Navy had directly called the matter to the attention ofHitler. Raeder says the Leader ”saw at once the significance of the Norwegianproblem.” He asked him to leave his notes on the subject and promised togive the question some thought. But at the moment the Nazi warlord waspreoccupied with launching his attack in the West and with overcoming thehesitations of his generals. ∗ Norway apparently slipped out of his mind. 802 Butit came back in two months – for three reasons. One was the advent of winter.Germany’s very existence depended upon the import of iron ore from Sweden.For the first war year the Germans were counting on eleven million tons of itout of a total annual consumption of fifteen million tons. During the warmweathermonths this ore was transported from northern Sweden down the Gulfof Bothnia and across the Baltic to Germany, and presented no problem evenin wartime, since the Baltic was effectively barred to British submarines andsurface ships. But in the wintertime this shipping lane could not be used becauseof thick ice. During the cold months the Swedish ore had to be shipped by railto the nearby Norwegian port of Narvik and brought down the Norwegian coastby ship to Germany. For almost the entire journey German ore vessels couldsail within Norway’s territorial waters and thereby escape destruction by Britishnaval vessels and bombers.Thus, as Hitler at first pointed out to the Navy, a neutral Norway had itsadvantages. It enabled Germany to obtain its lifeblood of iron ore withoutinterference from Britain.In London, Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, perceived this atonce and in the very first weeks of the war attempted to persuade the cabinetto allow him to lay mines in Norwegian territorial waters in order to stop theGerman iron traffic. But Chamberlain and Halifax were most reluctant to violateNorwegian neutrality, and the proposal was for the time being dropped. 803Russia’s attack on Finland on November 30, 1939, radically changed thesituation in Scandinavia, immensely increasing its strategic importance to boththe Western Allies and Germany. France and Britain began to organise anexpeditionary force in Scotland to be sent to the aid of the gallant Finns, who,defying all predictions, held out stubbornly against the onslaughts of the RedArmy. But it could reach Finland only through Norway and Sweden, and theGermans at once saw that if Allied troops were granted, or took, transit acrossthe northern part of the two Scandinavian lands enough of them would remain,∗ It was on October 10 that Hitler had called in his military chiefs, read them a longmemorandum on the necessity of an immediate attack in the West and handed them DirectiveNo. 6 ordering preparations for an offensive through Belgium and Holland. (See above, p.579.)