rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

358 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICHrapidly mobilizing, London stiffening, his own people apathetic, his leading generalsdead against him, and that his ultimatum on the Godesberg proposalsexpired at 2 P.M. the next day.His letter was beautifully calculated to appeal to Chamberlain. Moderate intone, it denied that his proposals would ”rob Czechoslovakia of every guaranteeof its existence” or that his troops would fail to stop at the demarcation lines. Hewas ready to negotiate details with the Czechs; he was ready to ”give a formalguarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia.” The Czechs were holding outsimply because they hoped, with the help of England and France, to start aEuropean war. Nevertheless, he did not slam the door on the last hopes ofpeace.I must leave it to your judgment [he concluded] whether, in view ofthese facts, you consider that you should continue your effort . . . tospoil such maneuvers and bring the Government in Prague to reasonat the very last hour. 389THE ELEVENTH HOURHitler’s letter, telegraphed urgently to London, reached Chamberlain at10:30 on the night of September 27. It came at the end of a busy day forthe Prime Minister.¡span class=”c22”¿The disquieting news which Sir Horace Wilson, who arrivedin London early in the afternoon, brought from his second conference withHitler spurred Chamberlain and his inner cabinet to action. It was decidedto mobilize the fleet, call up the Auxiliary Air Force and declare a state ofemergency. Already trenches were being dug in the parks and squares for protectionagainst bombing, and the evacuation of London’s school children hadbegun.¡/span¿Also, the Prime Minister promptly sent off a message to President Benesin Prague warning that his information from Berlin ”makes it clear that theGerman Army will receive orders to cross the Czechoslovak frontier immediatelyif, by tomorrow [September 28] at 2 P.M. the Czechoslovak Government havenot accepted the German conditions.” But having honorably warned the Czechs,Chamberlain could not refrain from admonishing them, in the last part of hismessage, ”that Bohemia would be overrun by the German Army and nothingwhich another Power or Powers could do would be able to save your countryand your people from such a fate. This remains true whatever the result of aworld war might be.”Thus Chamberlain was putting the responsibility for peace or war no longeron Hitler but on Benes. And he was giving a military opinion which even theGerman generals, as we have seen, held as irresponsible. However, he did add,at the end of his message, that he would not assume the responsibility of tellingthe Czechs what they must now do. It was up to them.But was it? Benes had not had time to reply to the telegram when a secondone arrived in which Chamberlain did endeavor to tell the Czech . governmentwhat to do. He proposed that the Czechs accept a limited German militaryoccupation on October 1 – of Egerland and Asch, outside the Czech fortifications