rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

THE ROAD TO MUNICH 357Finally, this German officer informed Berlin, the Italians were doing absolutelynothing to pin down French troops on the Franco-Italian frontier. 386Mussolini, the valiant ally, seemed to be letting Hitler down in a crucial hour.And then, the President of the United States and the King of Sweden werebutting in. The day before, on the twenty-sixth, Roosevelt had addressed anappeal to Hitler to help keep the peace, and though Hitler had answered itwithin twenty-four hours, saying that peace depended solely on the Czechs,there came another message from the American President during the course ofthis day, Wednesday the twenty-seventh, suggesting an immediate conference ofall the nations directly interested and implying that if war broke out the worldwould hold Hitler responsible. 387The King of Sweden, staunch friend of Germany, as he had proved duringthe 1914-18 war, was more frank. During the afternoon a dispatch arrivedin Berlin from the German minister in Stockholm saying that the King hadhastily summoned him and told him that unless Hitler extended his time limit ofOctober 1 by ten days world war would inevitably break out, Germany would besolely to blame for it and moreover just as inevitably would lose it ”in view of thepresent combination of the Powers.” In the cool, neutral air of Stockholm, theshrewd King was able to assess at least the military situation more objectivelythan the heads of government in Berlin, London and Paris.President Roosevelt, as perhaps was necessary in view of American sentiment,had weakened his two appeals for peace by stressing that the UnitedStates would not intervene in a war nor even assume any obligations ”in theconduct of the present negotiations.” The German ambassador in Washington,Hans Dieckhoff, therefore thought it necessary to get off a ”very urgent” cableto Berlin during the day. He warned that if Hitler resorted to force andwas opposed by Britain he had reason to assume ”that the whole weight of theUnited States [would] be thrown into the scale on the side of Britain.” And theambassador, usually a timid man when it came to standing up to the Fuehrer,added, ”1 consider it my duty to emphasize this very strongly.” He did not wantthe German government to stumble into the same mistaken assumptions it hadmade about America in 1914.And Prague? Was there any sign of weakening there? In the evening camea telegram from Colonel Toussaint, the German military attache”, to OKW:”Calm in Prague. Last mobilization measures carried out . . . Total estimatedcall-up is 1,000,000; field army 800,000 . . . ” 388 That was as many trained men asGermany had for two fronts. Together the Czechs and the French outnumberedthe Germans by more than two to one.Faced with these facts and developments and no doubt mindful of Wilson’sparting words and of Chamberlain’s character and of Chamberlain’s utter fearof war, Hitler sat down early on that evening of September 27 to dictate aletter to the Prime Minister. Dr. Schmidt, who was called in to translate itinto English, got the feeling that the dictator was shrinking back ”from theextreme step.” Whether Hitler knew that the order was going out that eveningfor the mobilization of the British fleet cannot be established. Admiral Raederarranged to see the Fuehrer at 10 P.M., and it is possible that the German Navylearned of the British move, which was made at 8 P.M. and publicly announcedat 11:38 P.M., and that Raeder informed Hitler by telephone. At any rate, whenthe Admiral arrived he appealed to the Fuehrer not to go to war.What Hitler did know at this moment was that Prague was defiant, Paris