rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

THE ROAD TO MUNICH 347a rump Czech state against Nazi Germany seems incredible, but his fantasticrecommendations apparently made a deep impression on the British cabinet andbolstered Chamberlain’s intention to meet Hitler’s demands. ∗Premier Daladier and his Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, arrived in Londonon September 18, for consultations with the British cabinet. No thoughtwas given to bringing the Czechs in. The British and the French, anxious toavoid war at any cost, lost little time in agreeing on joint proposals which theCzechs would have to accept. All territories inhabited more than 50 per cent bySudeten Germans must be turned over to Germany to assure ”the maintenanceof peace and the safety of Czechoslovakia’s vital interests.” In return Britain andFrance agreed to join in ”an international guarantee of the new boundaries . . .against unprovoked aggression.” Such a guarantee would supplant the mutualassistancetreaties which the Czech state had with France and Russia. Thiswas an easy way out for the French, and led by Bonnet, who, as the course ofevents would show, was determined to outdo Chamberlain in the appeasementof Hitler, they seized upon it. And then there was the cant.Both the French and British governments [they told the Czechs ina formal note] recognize how great is the sacrifice thus required ofthe Czechoslovak Government in the cause of peace. But becausethat cause is common both to Europe in general and in particularto Czechoslovakia herself they have felt it their duty jointly to setforth frankly the conditions essential to secure it.Also, they were in a hurry, The German dictator could not wait.The Prime Minister must resume conversations with Herr Hitler notlater than Wednesday [September 22], and earlier if possible. Wetherefore feel we must ask for your reply at the earliest possiblemoment. 375And so at noon on September 19 the British and French ministers in Praguejointly presented the Anglo-French proposals to the Czech government. Theywere rejected the next day in a dignified note which explained – prophetically– that to accept them would put Czechoslovakia ”sooner or later under thecomplete domination of Germany.” After reminding France of her treaty obligationsand also of the consequences to the French position in Europe shouldthe Czechs yield, the reply offered to submit the whole Sudeten question toarbitration under the terms of the German-Czech treaty of October 16, 1925. †But the British and French were in no mood to allow such a matter as thesanctity of treaties to interfere with the course they had set. No sooner was∗ Though the main points of Runciman’s recommendations were presented to the cabineton the evening of September 16, the report itself was not officially made until the twenty-first,and not published until the twenty-eighth, when events had made it only of academic interest.Wheeler-Bennett points out that certain parts of the report give the impression of havingbeen written after September 21. When Runciman left Prague on the morning of September16, no one, not even Hitler or the Sudeten leaders, had gone so far as to suggest that theSudetenland be turned over to Germany without a plebiscite. (Wheeler-Bennett, Munich, pp.111-12. The text of the Runciman report is in the British White Paper, Cmd. 5847, No. 1.)† It is worth noting that neither the British nor the French government published the textof this Czech note when they later issued the documents justifying their policies which led upto Munich.