rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

THE ROAD TO MUNICH 363and be ready for ”action” on September 30 – three days hence.What were the conspirators waiting for? All the conditions they themselveshad set had now been fulfilled. Hitler was in Berlin. He was determined to goto war. He had set the date for the attack on Czechoslovakia as September 30– two days away now. Either the putsch must be made at once, or it would betoo late to overthrow the dictator and stop the war.Kordt declares that during the day of September 27 the plotters set a definitedate for action: September 29. Gisevius, in his testimony on the stand atNuremberg and also in his book, claims that the generals – Haider and Wilzleben– decided to act immediately on September 28 after they got a copy of Hitler’s”defiant letter” with its ”insulting demand” to Chamberlain of the night before.Oster received a copy of this defiant letter [Gisevius says] late thatnight [September 27], and on the morning of September 28 I tookthe copy to Witzleben. Witzleben went to Haider with it. Now,at last, the Chief of the General Staff had his desired, unequivocalproof that Hitler was not bluffing, that he wanted war.Tears of indignation ran down Haider’s cheeks . . . Witzleben insistedthat now it was time to take action. He persuaded Haider to go tosee Brauchitsch. After a while Haider returned to say that he hadgood news: Brauchitsch was also outraged and would probably takepart in the Putsch. 396But either the text of the letter had been altered in the copying or thegenerals misunderstood it, for, as we have seen, it was so moderate in tone, sofull of promises to ”negotiate details with the Czechs” and to ”give a formalguarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia,” so conciliatory in suggestingto Chamberlain that he might continue his efforts, that the Prime Minister,after reading it, had immediately telegraphed Hitler suggesting a Big-Powerconference to settle the details and at the same time wired Mussolini asking hissupport for such a proposal.Of this eleventh-hour effort at appeasement the generals apparently hadno knowledge, but General von Brauchitsch, the Commander in Chief of theArmy, may have had some inkling. According to Gisevius, Witzleben telephonedBrauchitsch from Haider’s office, told him that all was ready and pleaded withhim to lead the revolt himself. But the Army commander was noncommittal.He informed Haider and Witzleben that he would first have to go over to theFuehrer’s Chancellery to see for himself whether the generals had assessed thesituation correctly. Gisevius says that Witzleben rushed back to his militaryheadquarters. ”Gisevius,” he declared excitedly, ”the time has come!”At eleven o’clock that morning of September 28 the phone rang at Kordt’sdesk in the Foreign Office. Ciano was on the line from Rome and wanted urgentlyto speak to the German Foreign Minister. Ribbentrop was not available – hewas at the Reich Chancellery – so the Italian Foreign Minister asked to be putthrough to his ambassador, Bernardo Attolico. The Germans listened in andrecorded the call. It developed that Mussolini, and not his son-in-law, wantedto do the talking.MUSSOLINI: This is the Duce speaking. Can you hear me?ATTOLICO: Yes, I hear you.