rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

THE TURN OF THE UNITED STATES 791show his growing impatience at the wraps which the Fuehrer had placed on theGerman Navy. At every interview he sought to change the Leader’s mind.Early that year, on February 4, Raeder submitted a memorandum to Hitlerin which the Navy expressed strong doubts about the value of continued Americanneutrality, as it was working out, to Germany. In fact the admirals arguedthat America’s entry into the war might even prove ”advantageous for the Germanwar effort” if Japan thereby became a belligerent on the side of the Axis. 1088But the Nazi dictator was not impressed by the argument.Raeder was greatly discouraged. The Battle of the Atlantic was at its heightand Germany was not winning it. American supplies under the Lend-Leaseagreement were pouring into Britain. The Pan-American Neutrality Patrol wasmaking it more and more difficult for the U-boats to be effective. All thisRaeder pointed out to Hitler, but without much effect. He saw the Leaderagain on March 18 and reported that U.S. warships were escorting Americanconvoys bound for Britain as far as Iceland. He demanded authority to attackthem without warning. He asked that something be done to prevent the U.S.A.from gaining a foothold in French West Africa. This possibility, he said, ”wasmost dangerous.” Hitler listened and said he would discuss these matters withthe Foreign Office (of all places!), which was one way of putting the admiralsoff. 1089All through the spring and early summer he continued to put them off. OnApril 20 he refused to listen to Raeder’s pleas ”for warfare against merchantships of the U.S.A., according to prize regulations.” 1090 The first recorded clashbetween American and German war vessels had occurred on April 10 whenthe U.S. destroyer Niblack dropped depth charges on a German U-boat whichshowed signs of attacking. On May 22 Raeder was back at the Berghof witha long memorandum suggesting countermeasures to President Roosevelt’s unfriendlyacts, but he could not move his Supreme Commander.The Fuehrer [the Admiral noted] considers the attitude of the Presidentof the United States still undecided. Under no circumstancesdoes he wish to cause incidents which would result in U.S. entry intothe war. 1091There was all the more reason to avoid such incidents when the campaign inRussia began, and on June 21, the day before the attack commenced, Hitler emphasizedthis to Raeder. The Grand Admiral had given him a glowing accountof how the V-253, spotting the U.S. battleship Texas and an accompanyingdestroyer within the blockade zone in the North Atlantic proclaimed by Germany,had ”chased and attempted to attack them” and had added that ”wherethe U.S.A. is concerned firm measures are always more effective than apparentyielding.” The Fuehrer agreed with the principle but not with the specific actionand once more he admonished the Navy.The Fuehrer declares in detail that until Operation Barbarossa iswell under way he wishes to avoid any incident with the U.S.A. Aftera few weeks the situation will become clearer, and can be expectedto have a favorable effect on the U.S.A. and Japan. America willhave less inclination to enter the war due to the threat from Japanwhich will then increase. If possible, therefore, in the next weeks allattacks on naval vessels in the closed area should cease.