rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

522 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICHa sham to fool the German people and, if possible, world opinion into believingthat Hitler had attempted at the last minute to reach a reasonable settlementof his claims against Poland. The Fuehrer admitted as much. Dr. Schmidt laterheard him say, ”I needed an alibi, especially with the German people, to showthem that I had done everything to maintain peace. This explains my generousoffer about the settlement of the Danzig and Corridor questions.” ∗Compared to his demands of recent days, they were generous, astonishinglyso. In them Hitler demanded only that Danzig be returned to Germany. Thefuture of the Corridor would be decided by a plebiscite, and then only after aperiod of twelve months when tempers had calmed down. Poland would keepthe port of Gdynia. Whoever received the Corridor in the plebiscite wouldgrant the other party extraterritorial highway and railroad routes through it –this was a reversion to his ”offer” of the previous spring. There was to be anexchange of populations and full rights accorded to nationals of one country inthe other.One may speculate that had these proposals been offered seriously theywould undoubtedly have formed at least the basis of negotiations between Germanyand Poland and might well have spared the world its second great war ina generation. They were broadcast to the German people at 9 P.M. on August31, eight and one half hours after Hitler had issued the final orders for the attackon Poland, and, so far as I could judge in Berlin, they succeeded in their aim offooling the German people. They certainly fooled this writer, who was deeplyimpressed by their reasonableness when he heard them over the radio, and whosaid so in his broadcast to America on that last night of the peace.Henderson returned to His Majesty’s Embassy that night of August 30-31,convinced, as he later said, ”that the last hope for peace had vanished.” Still, hekept trying. He roused the Polish ambassador out of bed at 2 A.M., invited himto hurry over to the embassy, gave him ”an objective and studiously moderateaccount” of his conversation with Ribbentrop, mentioned the cession of Danzigand the plebiscite in the Corridor as the two main points in the German proposals,stated that so far as he could gather ”they were not too unreasonable” andsuggested that Lipski recommend to his government that they should proposeat once a meeting between Field Marshals Smigly-Rydz and Goering. ”I feltobliged lo add,” says Henderson, ”that I could not conceive of the success ofany negotiations if they were conducted by Herr von Ribbentrop.” †666In the meantime the tireless Dahlerus had not been inactive. At 10 P.M. onAugust 29, Goering had summoned him to his home and informed him of the”unsatisfactory course” of the meeting just finished between Hitler, Ribbentropand Henderson. The corpulent Field Marshal was in one of his hysterical moods∗ The text of the sixteen proposals was telegraphed to the German charge d’affaires in Londonat 9:15 P.M. on August 30, four hours before Ribbentrop ”gabbled” them to Henderson.But the German envoy in London was instructed that they were to ”be kept strictly secretand not to be communicated to anyone else until further instructions.” 664 Hitler in his noteof the previous day, it will be remembered, had promised to place them at the disposal of theBritish government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.† In a dispatch to Halifax filed at 5:15 A.M. (August 31), Henderson reported that hehad also advised Lipski ”in the very strongest terms” to ”ring up” Ribbentrop and ask forthe German proposals so that he could communicate them to the Polish government. Lipskisaid he would first have to talk with Warsaw. ”The Polish Ambassador,” Henderson added,”promised to telephone at once to his Government, but he is. so inert or so handicapped byinstructions of his Government that I cannot rely on his action being very effective.” 665