rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT 479it may be expected that they would become German provinces.” This was thelast thing the Russians wanted, for it meant the presence of the Nazi armieson the Soviet border, and Voroshilov made a special point of the Admiral’sunfortunate remark. Finally, the uncomfortable Anglo-French representativescontended that Voroshilov had raised political questions which they were notcompetent to handle. Drax declared that since Poland was a sovereign state, itsgovernment would first have to sanction the entry of Russian troops. But sincethis was a political matter, it would have to be settled by the governments. Hesuggested that the Soviet government put its questions to the Polish government.The Russian delegation agreed that this was a political matter. But itinsisted that the British and French governments must put the question to thePoles and pressure them to come to reason. Were the Russians, in view of theirdealings with the Germans at this moment, negotiating in good faith with theFranco-British military representatives? Or did they, as the British and Frenchforeign offices, not to mention Admiral Drax, later concluded, insist on the rightto deploy their troops through Poland merely to stall the talks until they sawwhether they could make a deal with Hitler? ∗In the beginning, the British and French confidential sources reveal, theWestern Allies did think that the Soviet military delegation was negotiatingin good faith – in fact, that it took its job much too seriously. On August13, after two days of staff talks, Ambassador Seeds wired London that theRussian military chiefs seemed really ”to be out for business.” As a result,Admiral Drax’s instructions to ”go very slowly” were changed and on August15 he was told by the British government to support Doumenc in bringing themilitary talks to a conclusion ”as soon as possible.” His restrictions on confidingconfidential military information to the Russians were partially lifted.Unlike the British Admiral’s original instructions to stall, those given GeneralDoumenc by Premier Daladier personally had been to try to conclude amilitary convention with Russia at the earliest possible moment. Despite Britishfears of leaks to the Germans, Doumenc on the second day of the meetings hadconfided to the Russians such ”highly secret figures,” as he termed them, onthe strength of the French Army that the Soviet members promised ”to forget”them as soon as the meeting was concluded.As late as August 17, after he and Drax had waited vainly for three days forinstructions from their governments as to how to reply to the Polish question,General Doumenc telegraphed Paris: ”The U.S.S.R. wants a military pact . . .She does not want us to give her a piece of paper without substantial undertakings.Marshal Voroshilov has stated that all problems . . . would be tackledwithout difficulty as soon as what he called the crucial question was settled.”Doumenc strongly urged Paris to get Warsaw to agree to accepting Russianhelp.∗ The timing is important. Molotov did not receive the Nazi proposal that Ribbentropcome to Moscow until the evening of August 15. (See above, p. 465.) And though he did notaccept it definitely he did hint that Russia would be interested in a nonaggression pact withGermany, which of course would have made negotiation of a military alliance with France andBritain superfluous. The best conclusion this writer can come to is that, as of August 14,when Voroshilov demanded an ”unequivocal answer” to the question of allowing Soviet troopsto meet the Germans in Poland, the Kremlin still had an open mind as to which side to join.Unfortunately the Russian documents, which could clear up this crucial question, have notbeen published. At any rate, Stalin does not seem to have made his final decision until theafternoon of August 19. (See above, p. 470.)