rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich-william-shirer-pdf

THE LAST DAYS OF PEACE 531plied him with good food and drink. The cognac was of such high quality thatGoering insisted on lugging away two bottles of it when he left. Having gotthe Field Marshal into the proper humor, Dahlerus proposed that he inviteHenderson for a talk. After receiving Hitler’s permission, he did so, invitinghim and Forbes to his house for tea at 5 P.M. Dahlerus (whose presence isnot mentioned by Henderson in his Final Report or in his book) says that hesuggested that Goering, on behalf of Germany, meet a Polish emissary in Hollandand that Henderson promised to submit the proposal to London. The Britishambassador’s version of the tea talk, given in his Final Report, was that Goering”talked for two hours of the iniquities of the Poles and about Herr Hitler’s andhis own desire for friendship with England. It was a conversation which led tonowhere . . . My general impression was that it constituted a final but forlorneffort on his part to detach Britain from the Poles . . . I augured the worst fromthe fact that he was in a position at such a moment to give me so much of histime . . . He could scarcely have afforded at such a moment to spare time inconversation if it did not mean that everything down to the last detail was nowready for action.” The third and most piquant description of this bizarre teaparty was given by Forbes in answer to a questionnaire from Goering’s lawyerat Nuremberg.The atmosphere was negative and desperate, though friendly . . .Goering’s statement to the British ambassador was: If the Polesshould not give in, Germany would crush them like lice, and ifBritain should decide to declare war, he would regret it greatly, butit would be most imprudent of Britain. 679Later in the evening Henderson, according to his own account, drafted adispatch to London saying ”that it would be quite useless for me to make anyfurther suggestions since they would now only be outstripped by events andthat the only course remaining to us was to show our inflexible determinationto resist force by force.” ∗Sir Nevile Henderson’s disillusionment seemed complete. Despite all hisstrenuous efforts over the years to appease the insatiable Nazi dictator, hismission to Germany, as he called it, had failed. In the fading hours of August’slast day this shallow, debonair Englishman whose personal diplomacy in Berlinhad been so disastrously blind tried to face up to the shattering collapse of hisvain hopes and abortive plans. And though he would suffer one more typical,incredible lapse the next day, the first day of war, an ancient truth was dawningon him: that there were times and circumstances when, as he at last said, forcemust be met by force. †∗ He may have drafted it that evening but he did not send it to London until 3:45 P.M.the next day, nearly twelve hours after the German attack on Poland had begun. It followedseveral of his telegrams, which like it were telephoned to London – so that transmission wassimultaneous – reporting the outbreak of hostilities. It read: ”Mutual distrust of Germans andPoles is so complete that I do not feel I can usefully acquiesce [sic] in any further suggestionsfrom here, which would only once again be outstripped by events or lead to nothing as theresult of methods followed or of considerations of honor and prestige.”Last hope lies in inflexible determination on our part to resist force by force.” 680† Since friends who have read this section have expressed doubts about this writer’s objectivityin dealing with Henderson, perhaps another’s view of the British ambassador in Berlinshould be given. Sir L. B. Namier, the British historian, has summed up Henderson as follows:”Conceited, vain, self-opinionated, rigidly adhering to his preconceived ideas, he poured out