The Winton M. Blount Postal History Symposia - Smithsonian ...

n u m b e r 5 5 • 1 4 5stamps as the evidence of pre- payment of postage.” 10 Hisgrammatical tense was wrong, but his thought was right.Did Congress, based on the 1847 experience, nowagree that stamps were the answer—that they were all thatwas needed to eliminate the stampless system and therebyend the bane of unpaid mail? Well, that’s the way theyvoted.By 1850, in his “Report to the President,” PostmasterGeneral N.K. Hall recommended a further lowering ofrates by two cents for pre- paid domestic letters. 11 This newrate was adopted effective July 1, 1851—three cents perhalf ounce for a pre- paid letter and five cents for a letter sentunpaid (both rates for letters traveling up to 3,000 miles).This time there was much greater distribution of thestamps than had been the case in 1847, when only selectedpost offices received automatic distribution. The Act of1851 (Section 3), required, “it shall be the duty of thePostmaster General to provide and furnish to all deputypostmasters, and to all other persons applying and payingtherefore, suitable postage stamps of the denomination ofthree cents, and as such other denominations as he maythink expedient, to facilitate the prepayment of postageprovided for in this act” 12 all deputy postmasters— notjust the four percent of postmasters who received the 1847stamps!Indeed, in terms of my hypothesis, it is noteworthythat in the first month of availability, 10.5 million stampsof the 1851 issue were distributed; this compares to 5.5million stamps distributed for the full four years of the1847 issue. 13 Clearly, by 1851 Congress and the PostalSystem had seen their way out of the dilemma of unpaid“collect” mail. Stamps would be the answer, and Congresswanted to be sure stamps were widely available.The key factor for the public was, undoubtedly, thepreferential rate for prepaid letter mail that was obviouslydesigned to capitalize on the American core valueof “thriftiness.” Pre- payment was made a “bargain,” andstamps were now readily available to facilitate that bargain.Would the two mesh? Would the plan work?You bet it worked! It worked so well that by 1853,one reporter, who had conducted an extensive review ofthe New York Post Office, noted that: “the stamp systemis now becoming generally used in the United States.Nearly four- fifths of the paid home letters which areposted at New York are paid by stamps.” Furthermore, hesaid, “hardly three- fourths of the paid home letters whichare received at New York are franked in this easy, simpleprocess.” 14 Think about that: after little more than oneyear of the preferential rate for pre- paid letters, stampswere becoming “generally used,” with about 80% of paiddomestic letters leaving New York, and almost 75% ofpaid letters coming into New York, being franked withadhesive postage stamps!Prepayment had been established, and using stampswas obviously more desirable than cash from an administrativepoint of view. The public had also confirmed it—preferring stamps to cash as a pre- payment method.It was all there, the stage was set. Congress now hadthe confidence that stamps could do the job. First theymade pre- payment of domestic letter mail postage mandatoryin 1855. Six months later, the final step was takenwhen stamps and stamped envelopes became the only acceptablemeans of pre- payment for domestic letter mail.The loop was closed and the final piece of the GreatPostal Reform Movement had been put in place. Postagerates were significantly lower (and would go lower still);service was better (there were 25,565 post offices in operationby mid- 1856, compared to 14,183 in 1845); 15communications were enhanced (there were an estimated239,642 miles of postal routes in 1856, compared to143,940 miles in 1845); 16 the use of the mails by ordinarycitizens had grown exponentially; and, at last, “collect”letters (and the lost revenue and extra costs they engendered),had been eliminated.Using the 1847 stamps to eliminate unpaid mail wasprobably the intention for many all along, but whetherit was or not, the fact is that’s exactly what stamps did.And that demonstration—that stamps had the ability tocompletely change the system—was, without question, themost important benefit of our first American issue.NOTES1. In 1845, for example, “net revenue, after deducting commissionsof postmasters, contingent and incidental expenses,amounted to $2,942,217.” This compared to expenditures of$4,320,732 (or a net deficit of $1,378,515) – Report of the PostmasterGeneral, December 1, 1845, Doc. 2, pp. 850–8512. Similarly, the privileges given to newspapers, in the formof preferential postal rates, were another very significant contributorto post office deficits. Indeed, in his 1845 Report Of ThePostmaster General (p.857), Cave Johnson noted that “It is confidentlybelieved . . . that nine- tenths of the whole weight of themails, and a greater inequality in bulk, is composed of printedmatter, paying about one- ninth of the expense.” Nonetheless,because of various political and philosophical reasons, Congresswas unwilling to consider reforming those rates.3. Report of the Postmaster General, December 1, 1845,Doc. 2, p. 857. (In his 1848 Report, Johnson increased the estimateto 2,000,000 letters annually.)