5 2 • s m i t h s o n i a n c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o h i s t o ry a n d t e c h n o l o g yFigure 2. <strong>The</strong> Autocar screen- side truck used for the historic postal test run between Lancaster, Pennsylvania, andNew York City on March 20, 1918. This vehicle transported about 2900 pounds of farm produce in what was thelongest mail- delivery trip of its kind up to that time. Courtesy of the National <strong>Postal</strong> Museum Library, <strong>Smithsonian</strong>Institution Libraries.to the truck’s comparatively few stops in transit while deliveringthe produce to New York City from a rural areaover 100 miles away (Figure 2). 15 That night at the dinnermeeting of the Motor Truck Club of America, New York’sSecretary of State Francis Hugo called the test run, “anepoch in the history of the United States and the world.” 16Epoch or not, that test run and other aspects of the motortruck farm- to- table routes did receive positive public notice.This was because the whole enterprise fit in well withthe food- conservation ethos that dominated the war.<strong>The</strong> service, to be sure, was far from perfect. It couldbe expensive, first of all. Other periodic drawbacks includedtrucks breaking down and food getting spoiled intransit. Farmers nonetheless embraced the service, and notjust because of how much produce the motor trucks couldcarry. Many farmhands who normally might take produceelsewhere were serving in the military or performing otherwartime duties, and the Post Office Department’s programhelped mitigate that manpower shortage. 17Blakslee emphasized those linkages with the largerwar effort. As he noted in an April 1918 New Times article,“Government profit in any branch of the postal serviceis a good thing, but at the present time that takes secondplace when compared to the necessity for food productionon the biggest possible scale. And do not forget that wehave less men than ever to produce the food.” 18 Throughoutthe U.S. involvement in World War I, the Farm- to-Table postal delivery service was widely praised in thepress. Hoover hailed the service as an important means ofsaving food. 19Blakslee, trying to seize this momentum, promoted anationwide network of profitable motor truck routes. Hereasoned that the surplus he felt would surely result fromthose routes could be used to improve the roads on whichthe vehicles traveled. Virginia’s Senator Claude Swanson,in fact, introduced a bill authorizing the Postmaster Generalto establish such routes and to use half the gross revenuesfrom those routes for road improvements. That billdied in a Senate committee, but in July 1918 Congress didappropriate a smaller amount for a few more experimentalroutes. Just a few months later, however, the armisticewith Germany was signed. <strong>The</strong> Treaty of Versailles in Juneof the following year would officially end the state of war,but the armistice halted the actual fighting. 20In the post- armistice atmosphere, Blakslee and othersin the department found it tougher to extend—let alonemaintain—the farm- to- table postal delivery program andin particular its motor truck routes. <strong>The</strong> once solid public
n u m b e r 5 5 • 5 3support for that program faded away and use of those servicesfell off markedly. Blakslee worked hard to salvagethe initiative, but it increasingly became a lost cause. Congressultimately eliminated the program in 1920, and subsequentattempts to bring it back later that decade and thenext went nowhere. 21<strong>The</strong> reasons for the initiative’s rapid demise are diverseand deep- seated. One likely cause is that the high- pitchwartime fervor bolstering the initiative quickly evaporatedonce the guns in Europe fell silent. Many farmers, for example,had embraced the program out of economic necessityand also because their president exhorted them tohelp save the world; with the exigencies of war now past,those same farmers and their prospective consumers werefar less inclined to tolerate any inconveniences that camewith the motor truck service. 22<strong>The</strong>re was also competition from the private sectorthat blossomed more fully in the war’s aftermath. A numberof entities moving into the delivery business offeredto get the job done more cheaply. A case in point was theMaryland- based Farmers’ Cooperative Association HarfordCounty, which operated a lucrative franchise transportingfarm goods to Baltimore. <strong>The</strong>n there were theself- service grocery markets, which first sprang up at thistime and gave many consumers yet more food- shoppingalternatives. 23Another factor was unquestionably the tense relationsbetween the Post Office Department and Congress.It would be an understatement to say that Blakslee neverquite endeared himself with the lawmakers on CapitolHill. He could come across as hostile, self- righteous, andeven naïve. Back in 1916, several senators demandedBlakslee’s ouster after he charged members of the SenatePost Office Committee with inordinately favoring the railroadswhen it came to rural mail service. That uproar dieddown, and Blakslee kept his job, only after the committeechairman accepted his letter of apology. 24 Despite thatclose call, Blakslee continued his often confrontational approachwith Congress. He did not do himself or the motortruck routes any favors during the war, for instance, whenhe once characterized a proposed congressional appropriationfor that service as “ridiculously small.” 25 By 1920,with the war over and the Wilson Administration’s daysnumbered, Congress had even less reason than before toindulge Blakslee and keep his farm- to- table cause alive.Individually, any of these factors would have beenenough to seriously hobble the farm- to- table postal deliveryprogram in the wake of the armistice; collectively,they sealed that initiative’s fate. <strong>The</strong> initiative is worthremembering, though. First of all, it embodied both thespirit and the substance of food conservation efforts duringWorld War I. It also underscored how the Post OfficeDepartment’s commitment to mobilization efforts wentwell beyond just plastering “Food Will Win the War” announcementsin post offices. 26<strong>The</strong> initiative can also be seen in an even larger senseas a case study of postal operations in periods of nationalurgency, as well as a cautionary tale about how a wartimeenterprise does not always survive the peace that follows.In addition, the initiative exemplifies how any major war’simpact can last long after its battles have ceased. A keyresult of World War I was the dynamic growth of Americanhighways and surface transportation in the decadesever since. When the United States entered that conflict,the railroads constituted the preeminent form of transportation.<strong>The</strong> trains were soon overwhelmed, however, bythe demands of moving vital supplies throughout a nationgetting mobilized for war. Consequently, more and moretrucks were produced and deployed to fill that logisticalvacuum and guarantee that crucial shipments reachedtheir destinations.Trucks came into their own during World War I, andtheir increased numbers, coupled with the equally dramaticgrowth in automobiles, made it imperative thathighways be better able to accommodate heavier traffic.<strong>The</strong> war therefore laid the groundwork for major longrangeprojects that would create the stronger, wider, andsmoother roads we still use today. <strong>The</strong> Post Office Department,through such endeavors as the wartime farmto-table program, very much reflected this transportationtrend. Interestingly, it did so under a postmaster generalusually deemed to be among the worst in American history.Burleson’s tenure was without a doubt stormy, forreasons ranging from the harsh treatment of the rank- andfileemployees to his heavy- handed enforcement of the EspionageAct. 27One of the more progressive postal achievements duringthis time, however, was arguably that expanded use ofmotorized transportation. That chapter of postal historyis critical to understanding how the agency went frompossessing a handful of horseless carriages to becomingcustodian of the world’s largest vehicular fleet. 28 Blakslee,for all of his own professional and personal shortcomings,was the catalyst in that transformation. He readilygrasped the possibilities of motorized vehicles—especiallythose trucks he pressed into service for the farm- to- tableprogram—and the highways upon which they traveled. “Imay be considered visionary and a dreamer when I assertthat the use of the highways is the only present, practicablesolution of inadequate or inefficient transportation,”