HARVARD UKRAINIAN STUDIES - See also - Harvard University

558 ReviewsGalician towns. That social group, which had remained until that time uncertain ofits national loyalties, demonstrated in this manner its final decision to distance itselffrom the Ukrainian national movement. 10Demkovyc-Dobrjans'kyj also presents the reactions in Vienna, by other Slavicpoliticians in the Habsburg monarchy (Tomas Masaryk), and in the internationalpress. A broader presentation of the Polish position would have been welcome.Potocki's successor, the well-known Polish historian Michai Bobrzynski, also aCracow conservative, was much more consistent than his predecessor in striving fora compromise with the Ukrainian movement based on electoral reform. His concept,which called for normalizing the situation before Vienna intervened directlyand thus weakened the situation of Poles in the monarchy, met with determinedcounteraction from the Polish nationalist camp. With support from the Latinepiscopate of Galicia, Bobrzynski was dismissed. This did not stop the changes thatfinally occurred during the tenure of Witold Korytowski as viceroy. The outbreak ofthe First World War would bring to naught the compromise achieved with suchdifficulty.Demkovyc-Dobrjans'kyj tries to examine the position of the church towards theevents described. Metropolitan Septyc'kyj was certainly active on behalf of theGreek-Catholic episcopate. Among Polish churchmen the most active were theLatin-rite Metropolitan of Lviv Jozef Bilczewski and Bishop of Cracow Adam S.Sapieha, and the Armenian-rite Archbishop of Lviv Jozef Teodorowicz (theadherents of the Armenian rite in Galicia had been polonized by this time).Septyc'kyj could easily reconcile his national solidarity with his episcopal duties,but the nationalist attitudes of Teodorowicz and Bilczewski led them to abuse theirdignity and manipulate the teachings of the church. A theological controversydeveloped among bishops. Poles accused the planned reform of inconsistency withChristian theology; later they had to disavow that point in an embarrassing silencewhen their own political camp, the National Democrats, finally reconciled itself tothe reform.Archbishop Teodorowicz was a driving Polish force in the episcopate. Veryactive politically, he had a remarkable political temperament coupled with an inabilityto conduct practical political interplay. His sharp and uncompromising statements,made without a sober assessment of the situation, brought unwanted consequences.His behavior in 1913-1914 deprived him of authority in Vienna. All thathe achieved was to delay the victory of the program against which he fought. Hislater efforts, undertaken at the Vatican in the interests of the Polish raison d'etat inUpper Silesia (1920-1921), led to total catastrophe: a conflict with Pope BenedictXV and his nuncio in Poland, Achille Ratti. The latter, who soon thereafter becamepope, forbade him political activity in the Polish parliament.In Bobrzyriski's judgment (as quoted by Demkovyc-Dobrjans'kyj), there was alink between a political solution to the Polish-Ukrainian problem and the emergenceof an agreement between the two important social institutions of the two nations—10Look, for example, at "Perexody na latynstvo," Nyva (Lviv, 1909), pp. 594-96.