10 CFR 50.71(e) - Maritime Administration - U.S. Department of ...

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Updated Final Safety Analysis Report - (STS-004-002)For many years, it has been the practice to design merchant ships to severe conditions (less than extreme),with relatively high safety factors. The soundness of this approach is evidenced by years of experience inwhich ordinary merchant ships have survived hurricane seas without damage.In September 1964 and in February 1965, the NSS encountered severe storms at sea. After the latterstorm, buckling of A-deck in the way of hatch 4 on both port and starboard sides was quite apparent. Asa result of investigation, data collection, and calculations, it was concluded that the hull had amplestrength reserves against static forces arising from bending on standard waves. However, the buckleddeck was produced by overstressing under sagging compression after initial deflection from other causes.These ship motions occurred in heavy and confused seas, while in a light ship condition.The A-deck was reinforced during the NSS’s 1965 Galveston Outage to provide greater resistance tobuckling of the deck plating under sagging compression, so that the resulting stresses will be axial withrespect to the plating. Calculations show the deck stresses are well below generally acceptable values.The longitudinal girders provide assurance that the plating will remain in position to absorb thesecompressive stresses without additional bending stresses due to deflections. The reinforcement isconsidered adequate to minimize the possibility of a future recurrence of the deck buckling.The NSS propulsion machinery was designed with the following specifications for roll, pitch, and heave:Maximum roll 30 degrees from the vertical, with periods of 13 and 23 seconds (center of roll 20 to 30 feetabove the baseline) in light and loaded conditions.Pitch and heave - maximum pitch amplitude of 7 degrees combined pitch and heave accelerations, 0.25 to0.30 g at the reactor.These criteria represent very severe conditions, and in no case will they be exceeded by a factor as greatas two. Ship motion can be sharply reduced by changing course and speed in heavy seas.The safety factors employed in the design of the NSS are considered adequate, and it is estimated that allher components can withstand accelerations of at least 1 g, and in most cases 2 g. Since the maximumloading (static plus dynamic) defined by the design criteria is about 0.6 g (roll), the margin is fullyadequate for maximum sea conditions. No damage to machinery components from ship motion hasresulted in previous storms or is expected under any sea condition.12.6 Fire and ExplosionAll of the originally installed fire protection system equipment, with the exception of a limited number ofportable fire extinguishers, is deactivated, disabled and performs no active function.Fire from an external source is not considered a threat. External explosions present only a missile hazard,and the reactor and containment are well protected by the ship’s structure and the reactor’s shielding. Theberthing area surrounding the ship is maintained and kept free of any significant quantities of combustiblevegetation and material. The local fire company will respond to fires adjacent to the ship (e.g., pier,berth, drydock, etc.) that could pose a threat to the ship.The possibility of internal fire and explosions is minimized since the NSS is no longer in commercialoperation. During the period of protective storage, the possibility of fire is virtually eliminated by controlof transient combustibles and the lack of any routine, significant industrial activity. During any period ofindustrial activity, appropriate controls are established regarding prevention, detection and mitigation offire.The Fire Detection and Alarm System is described in Section 2.4.2.Rev. VI 132
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report - (STS-004-002)Regardless of the cause of a fire, damage to the reactor and auxiliary systems should be negligible and, ingeneral, limited to shielding. Since the reactor has been defueled since Fall 1971, the major source ofradioactivity has been removed. Hence, fire and resulting damage to shielding is not considered a threatto nuclear safety.The local fire company will respond to fires on the ship. To ensure they are sufficiently trained to fightshipboard fires, they are invited to attend indoctrination training that includes a discussion of ship hazardsand a familiarization tour.Transient combustibles will be controlled to limit the combustible material available to fuel a fire. Hotwork permits will be required to control spark producing activities and the use of ignition sources. Workarea safety inspections and trained fire watches will be required as appropriate for hot work activities.12.7 Flooding and SinkingDuring its operating period, preservation of the containment vessel after a sinking event was assured byflooding hatches (located in the containment shell) which would open automatically when the shipsubmerged in deep water. When the pressures were equalized inside and outside the containment vessel,the flooding hatches would close automatically, sealing the vessel. This protected the containment shellagainst external pressures in deep sinking. These hatches remain installed but have not been verifiedfunctional since final shutdown in November 1970.12.8 SalvageSalvage methods depend on the depth of the water since operational difficulties increase with depth. Inless than 300 feet of water, almost complete control of the containment is possible. Salvage connections,sized to take a standard U.S. Navy diver’s hose, are located on the head of the containment shell cupola.These connections permit sampling and purging of the containment contents. If permanentimmobilization is required, the same connections can be used to fill the vessel with concrete.If sinking occurs in water less than 100 feet deep, the ship and the containment may be raised andsalvaged. At these depths, the containment is flooded with salt water. Under extreme diving conditions,which limit underwater salvage, the ship’s structure could be removed from the containment vessel andthe containment raised by tidal lift.At depths greater than 300 feet, the ship is inaccessible to salvage. The flooded containment vessel is avery effective waste disposal package. With the low corrosion rates in deep water, it will take many yearsfor the sea water to penetrate the containment shell. Most of the fission products will be contained withinthe massive primary system, and the probability of environmental contamination is negligible.The methods of immobilization and recovery used to salvage the sunken vessel can also be used tosalvage the grounded vessel. The accessibility of the grounded vessel will generally simplify theoperation.In conclusion, little or no hazard to the environment is anticipated from either the sunken or the groundedship.Rev. VI 133
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