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UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206together to carry out collective work in agriculture or for constructing homes, to celebratefestivals or to fight wars. 282.3. State Intervention and the Militarization of the System of ConflictsThe disintegration of the “Darfurian” identity provided the government with an opportunity toseize the initiative for military intervention in the province. Its involvement prevented anyhope of a return to some kind of status quo that may have been achieved with the appropriatepolitical responses. With a minimum amount of prevention, money and, above all, politicalgood will on the part of Khartoum, it would have been possible to prevent the escalatinginsecurity in Darfur. The inter-community conflict related to rights of way and land use,required rapid decisions from the Sudanese government. Although the government hadexpressed no interest in the local population until then, it decided to use the crisis to tighten itscontrol over Darfur, and did so by exploiting the rivalries and differences that were flaring up,as in the case of land ownership. The government’s stance hastened the redefinition of themany, complex relationships individuals and communities had with their land and theirattachment to it and their own identity.In 2003, an insurrection broke out in Darfur just when the power struggle between thecentral government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan wasdrawing to an end and Idriss Déby, who had come to power in Chad in 1990, was attemptingto dismantle the rebel forces. As I mentioned earlier, at the time the Khartoum governmentrelied on a national army (composed for the most part of people from Darfur) to fight in SouthSudan. These demilitarization processes served to reconfigure the situation in Darfur.On 25 February 2003, the Darfur Liberation Front (FLD), led by Abdel WahidMohamed Nur, launched an insurrection in the Jebel Marra, to the west of Sudan. Originallycomposed of Four village self-defense groups, it took the name of Sudan Liberation Army(SLA) in March that year to highlight the presence of other communities such as the Masalit,the Zaghawa and Berti within it. The SLA was well-trained and benefited from the experienceof its military leader, Abdallah Abakkar, who had helped Idriss Déby take power in Chad in1990. Abakkar’s trajectory reveals how some actors succeeded in transferring their warexperience in Chad to armed struggle in their own provinces. The rebels seized Golo in JebelMarra, where they established their headquarters and Tine on the border with Chad. Theybecame credible players when they seized the airport in El Fasher (the capital of NorthDarfur) on 25 April 2003 and captured General Ibrahim Bushra, the Sudanese air forcecommander. In North Darfur, a second group also stood out, the Movement for Justice andEquality (MJE), composed of Zaghawa and headed by Doctor Khalil Ibrahim. 29 Despite theceasefire signed in September 2003, the war continued and spread to the border regions.The Sudanese government became aware of the power struggle with the Darfur rebelgroups, former village self-defense bodies that had become political players. Their change ofidentity helped to transform the earlier intra-community conflict into a war. The rebels’capacity to intervene in the political arena was, in the eyes of the Darfur inhabitant, aconsecration of the loss of legitimacy of the Sudanese government. The government’sinability to cater to their demands and ensure fair and non-partisan order, made the use offorce for demanding their rights to their representatives, legitimate in their eyes.28 Tubiana, Jérôme: “The Chad–Sudan Proxy War and the ‘Darfurization’ of Chad: Myths and Reality“, SmallArms Survey, n°12 (April 2008).29For more detail on the history of the formation of those two groups, see Marchal, “Soudan d’un conflit àl’autre”, op. cit.114
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206In 2003, a portion of the loyalist troops engaged in South Sudan became available. Thegovernment was now able to reinforce the army and take the offensive. However, since itcould not use the national army to intervene, given that it was largely composed of peopleoriginally from Darfur, it played on the rift in Darfurian identity. The government decided toarm the Janjaweed and give it a free hand in attacking the rebel villages. These warriors“came from the most part from the small camel-driving tribes in the north of Darfur,impoverished and marginalized, who did not obtain dar from the British colonial authoritiesand were suffering the effects of climate change and ecological deterioration”. 30The attacks were often led jointly with the Sudanese national air force while theJanjaweed pursued their raids. Although the conflict did not spread to the point of opposing“Arabs” and “Africans” (to put it simply), it did turn into a civil war that extended beyond justa few villages. “Poverty and greater competition for decreasing resources, a way of life andsurvival in conflict, the abundance of weapons and armed communities, the absence of anymediating authorities and the presence of an aggressive state, meant that Darfur was ripe foran explosion”. 31Darfur became the arena for an armed conflict that was of particular concern to thegovernment. Because the population in the province was poor and had nothing to lose, itproved to have warlike qualities that could jeopardize the government. From the outset thegovernment’s main fear was to find itself in a compromising situation should any alliance beformed between the rebels in the South and those in Darfur. Its response to the rebellion inDarfur was therefore brutal in order to be exemplary, and that violence prolonged the effectsof the massive deterioration in people’s living conditions over several decades. On 9 February2004 President Omar El Bechir declared his loyalist army’s victory and announced the end ofmilitary operations. But although the army had regained control of the towns, the fighting andthe massacre of civilians continued. In 2005, a peace agreement was signed under pressurefrom the international community, and the United States in particular.3. Local, National, Regional, International: A Multi-Scale ConflictWhile the conflict in Darfur was already taking place on a local and national scale, it wentinternational in 2003. Intensified combat attracted the attention of the internationalcommunity, which further reinforced the system of conflicts. The question then, is to find outwhether or not international intervention had an impact on the duration and intensity of theviolence in a province where the power struggle between players was already marked by thepractice of proxy wars at regional level, and how the various conflicts overlapped.3.1 International Intervention as a Catalyst in the System of Conflicts?Starting out from the idea that conflict formation is always defined and influenced by theinterests of the players, it is worth remembering the international context in which the Darfurcrisis occurred. In February 2003, the seriousness of the war there timidly emerged on theinternational media scene. At the time the UN agencies were focused on Iraq and NorthKorea, was well as the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) and thedeployment of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Furthermore, the30 Tanner, op.cit., p.722.31 Ibid., p.720.115
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Juan Emilio CheyreDirector, Center
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