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UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206the fact that the elections were hardly free and fair, many international actors active in theregion accepted the election results without criticism.5. Challenges to Governance, Development, and Security during the CPAInterim PeriodThe autonomous position of the GoSS strengthened orientation towards increasing selfgovernance.The fact that GoSS was responsible for local political decisions, security, andeconomy made it possible to convince its external allies about its potential to convert into anewly independent state. However the model adopted, which is largely built upon theexperience of SPLM/A administration during the war, 62 suffered from two divergingperspectives, one based on centralization and other on decentralization. While the externalinterveners and the SPLM/A prioritized the construction of strong state institutions, theSPLM/A’s preference for concentrating power under strong centralized administration defiedlocal level decentralization that would allow local populations a degree of politicalparticipation. In practice, during the 2005-2011 period the GoSS concentrated power andresources rather exclusively, while state governments and local administrations werecondemned to very limited funding 63 and became representative bodies dominated byesteemed members of the main SPLM/A affiliated local ethnic groups but in most caseswithout the capacity diminish local outbreaks of violence significantly.The GoSS exclusiveness and centralization of power led to exclusion of a number ofsmaller parties and their constituencies, particularly in the opposition. During 2005-2011,these often complained about continued marginalization, powerlessness, and lack of politicalfreedom for the opposition, despite holding token positions in the Southern Sudan LegislativeAssembly and the GoSS. 64 Their complaints related to deeply engrained political“tribalism”, 65 which has generated and upheld ethnic cleavages, political instability, andviolence in Southern Sudan. At the level of a number of GoSS institutions “tribalism” hascombined with nepotism. 66 From this perspective “tribalism” is not only a political but also asocioeconomic issue in terms of patronage, hiring practices, and public salaries. Practice offavoritism in hiring therefore ties in with a carefully maintained system in which individualswithin the political institutions, who pose a potential threat to the SPLM/A hegemony in theorganization in question, tend to be kept in check by members occupying lower positions inthe same structure.Evaluation, Juba, Government of Southern Sudan, p. 114. The SPLM for Democratic Change (SPLM-DC)claimed the leadership of the opposition as the second and as the only Southern opposition party.62 Rolandsen, op. cit.; and Branch, Adam and Mampilly, Zachariah C.: “Winning the War, but Losing the Peace?The Dilemma of SPLM/A Civil Administration and the Tasks Ahead”, The Journal of Modern African Studies,vol. 43, n° 1 (2009), pp. 1-20.63 Despite the stated commitment to decentralization, in 2012 still 84% of the state budget remains with theGoSS while only 16% has reached regional governments. See i.e. ST: “Only 16% of South Sudan’s budgetreaches state governments – report”, Sudan Tribune, 25 May 2012, at http://www.sudantribune.com/Only-14-of-South-Sudan-s-budget,4270164 Based on interviews conducted in Juba in December 2008.65 A locally used term meaning organization of political activity by “bigmen” along ethnic or clan lines in benefitof own constituencies through patron-client networks. See also Utas, Mats (ed.) (2012): African Conflicts andInformal Power: Big Men and Networks, London, Zed Books.66 Interviews and observations in Juba in December 2010.26
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206However, “tribalism” is not limited to the GoSS institutions but has continued to orientpolitical and economic conduct and practices. Although authorities have attempted toconvince others that “tribalism” is a passing phenomenon that can be addressed through“peace”, “stability”, and “development”, 67 this has not been the case in the short-term as theroots of ethnic politics in Southern Sudan are long and consolidated as the base of socialorganization of political activity. In fact, in 2011 some ethnic groups still referred to theirneighbors in the own languages as “enemies” 68 and inter-ethnic violent practices such ascattle-rustling claimed thousands of lives. 69 Therefore, “tribalism” continues to remain as amajor threat to the unity of Southern Sudan, as many observers have warned about the realpossibility of disintegration of the region 70 in the absence of a political climate able toaccommodate a large group of ethnically diverse strongmen and their constituencies. In thiscontext, the portraying of “tribalism” by some GoSS officials as a non-modern and easilycurable condition has been counterproductive and is contradicted by the everyday politicalconduct based on “bigman” patronage loyalties and inter-ethnic relations in many parts ofSouthern Sudan. However, simultaneously, highlighting “tribalism” in political discoursesand media has served to justify the continued focus on prioritizing the security sector.5.1. Development AspectsThe CPA and the end of war generated conditions in which external interveners sought toengage in economic (re)construction and development. Again channeled through the GoSS,these efforts were to a large extend conditioned by the exclusive partnership between externalactors and the local government. In any event, the initial enthusiasm was accompanied by thebooming economic (re)construction climate, which resulted in large quantities of foreigndirect investment. The resources for development came largely from the GoNU, and the GoSSofficial partners which include the World Bank, the UN, Joint Donor Team, Multi-DonorTrust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS), 71 Sweden, Canada, Norway, Denmark, theUnited Kingdom, the European Union, the US, Germany, and Japan. 72 Other private andpublic business partners investing in Southern Sudan came, for instance, from a number ofAsian, Arab, and African countries, as well as other European states. Along with the MDTF-SS and other public investment and development schemes, Southern Sudan received largequantities of private investment during the period of CPA implementation.In the case of Southern Sudan in 2005-2011 external investment and economic supportwas hardly neutral. Rather, it was charged with diverse political imperatives with majorimpact in capacitating the GoSS economically having been the strengthening of the separatistsentiment to secede from Sudan. This was to an extent linked to the highest GoSSleadership’s growing capacity to act independently from Khartoum as well as it being largelycontrolled by the SPLM/A’s separatist power center. As a result, the political climate in67 UNMIS: “Sudan: SSLA speaker - Replace tribalism with justice and peace”, Report, United Nations Missionto Sudan, 24 January 2011, athttp://unmis.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=511&ctl=Details&mid=697&ItemID=1210968 Interviews in December 2010 in Torit.69 ICG: “Jonglei’s Tribal Conflicts: Countering Insecurity in South Sudan”, Africa Report n° 154, InternationalCrisis Group, 23 December 2009b.70 Omeje, Kenneth: “Dangers of Splitting a Fragile Rentier State: Getting it Right in Southern Sudan”,Occasional Paper, ACCORD, 2010.71 The CPA stipulated the establishment of the MDTF-SS, but the expectations related to it have been higherthan the achievements. See i.e. WB: “Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan: Taking Stock and a WayForward”, A FR/OPCS, Implementation Support Mission, The World Bank, 2011.72 See i.e. “Development Partners”, Government of the Republic of South Sudan, 21 September 2011, athttp://www.goss.org/.27
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