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UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206Khartoum government took care to conceal events in a province that was closed to foreignobservers including international agencies and journalists. 32It was not until December 2003 that the “major Western powers, mediators andobservers in the negotiations underway in Kenya at the time, [decided] to express themselveson the escalating conflict in a remote area of Sudan. The considerable time lag between thecrisis bursting onto the media stage and its recognition at diplomatic levels gave theimpression that Darfur was inviting itself to the negotiating table”. 33 Darfur was threateningthe “peacemaker” image that Khartoum sorely needed for its negotiations with the SudanPeople’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Negotiations were carried out under the watchful eye ofthe United States, the first country to take a firm position against Sudan in January 2004. TheUS not only sought a conclusion to the peace talks with the South but a ceasefire agreementand discussions with all the Sudanese rebel movements.The internationalization of the Darfur issue accelerated with the growing accusations ofgenocide against the Khartoum government. That had particular resonance in April 2004when Rwanda commemorated the 10 th anniversary of the genocide. It is important to note thatfrom the start, this crisis entered the international area as a result of a collision between twotime scales and the instrumentalization by political leaders of the “anniversary syndrome”. 34That alarm signal caught the attention of Western leaders and public opinion, concerned aboutthe impact such a crisis might have if it were to deteriorate further. Mukesh Kapila, UnitedNations Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, provided the media with an opportunity tofocus on the image of refugees. By choosing victimization as an angle to inform about thesituation, the international community provided the Khartoum government with a means forattracting attention and then appropriating international aid. Aid could only be put in place bynegotiating with the Sudanese government, which had no compunction about regularlyexpelling any NGOs it considered undesirable. In 2006, it even refused access to Darfur to JanEgeland, the UN Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs. Khartoum’s objectivewas to win time by profiting from the international community’s inconsistent political actions,which put the humanitarian organizations in the front line. While waiting for politicaldecisions, the Darfur problem was treated as a humanitarian emergency.Meanwhile, the massive displacement of people and the refugees fleeing the civil war inDarfur led to a public health crisis. People found themselves in camps with insufficient watersupplies and the poor hygiene led to epidemics of diarrhea and other mortal diseases.Nevertheless, the real issue in that major humanitarian theater was the safety of the refugees.Making the camps secure proved to be a major problem for the international bodies, since theJanjaweed, now incorporated in the army and police force, were charged with protecting thepopulation, and they used the refugee camps to extend their zone of influence and supplythemselves with food, men and weapons. New towns appeared out of nowhere and campsbecame veritable tinderboxes. 35 The NGOs were not only hostage to the Sudanese politicalpower games but victims of rebel attacks themselves. Khartoum exploited the complexity ofthe situation by claiming that it was unable to achieve the objectives imposed by theinternational community. For instance, Resolution 1556, adopted on 22 July 2004, which gave32 Fontrier, Marc (2009): Le Darfour: organisations internationales et crise régionale: 2003-2008, Paris,l’Harmattan, p. 21.33 Marchal, “Soudan d’un conflit à l’autre”, op. cit., p. 38.34 Ancelin Schützenberger, Anne (1993): Aïe, mes aïeux!: liens transgénérationnels, secrets de famille,syndrome d'anniversaire et pratique du génosociogramme, Paris, La Méridienne, p. 194.35 Fontrier, op. cit., p. 221.116
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206the Sudanese government until 30 August to disarm the Janjaweed militia, was deemedunrealistic by Khartoum.Growing public condemnation, threats of oil embargos and restrictions on themovements of certain government officials in Khartoum, identified as being responsible forthe crimes committed in Darfur, had no effect. Even though the situation in Darfur had beenreferred to the International Criminal Court less than three months after the ComprehensivePeace Agreement in the South (2005), the Sudanese regime pursued confrontations on twofronts, the one political and the other military. Khartoum was continually double-dealing therebels in Darfur as well as the international community, which it perceived as beingdangerously partial to rebel demands. Throughout the Darfur peace negotiations, theSudanese regime exploited the antagonisms between the most interventionist countries on theone hand, and China, Russia and the League of Arab States on the other, as well as the UnitedNations (UN) and the African Union (AU), which were sharply divided.Even after the African Union’s Mission to Sudan (AMIS) was deployed, it wascontinually discredited by the continual time lag between the commitments taken, thedeclarations of intent and the actual achievements. From May 2004 to December 2007,AMIS’ objective was to establish a more suitable peacekeeping force that was better equippedby the UN, but the Sudanese government objected. AMIS had neither the means nor theexperience, and its mission grow more complex day by day. The cooperation between thevarious parties committed to it was a makeshift institutional attempt to bring some coherenceto the military, political and humanitarian operations.Despite the support of its partners, the AU’s main difficulty proved to be financing themission and once it reached a dead end with empty coffers, the pan-African organization hadno choice but to transfer the operation to a United Nations peace force. However, under theAMIS mandate, now incorporated into the African Union/UN Hybrid Operation (UNAMID)in 2007, the law and order situation in Darfur scarcely improved. The AU had committeditself under difficult conditions and in a context when most of the Sudanese protagonists didnot fully cooperate with AMIS, and regularly and deliberately broke their commitments.Above all, Sudan benefitted from solidarity and sympathy within the African Union, whichconstituted a serious obstacle to any approach vetoed by Khartoum.The warring factions’ reactions to the announcement that operations were beingtransferred from the AU to the UN were ambiguous. The divided rebels feared seeing thepoorly equipped African contingents replaced with well-trained troops that might challengetheir predatory economy, while the Sudanese government “did not want to see trainedcontingents, which might prevent it from pursuing a complex strategy that aimed to cut theirlosses in South Sudan by maintaining other revolts in a state of dormant war”. 36 After longnegotiations the international community succeeded in making the Sudanese governmentaccept the principle of a “hybrid” AU/UN force. Despite having precise functions, its globaland more ambitious objectives required a longer-term commitment. The Security Council’sResolution 1769 stated that UNAMID must “protect its personnel, facilities, installations andequipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel andhumanitarian workers”. At the same time its intervention was meant to help create anenvironment favorable to economic reconstruction and development prior to the lasting returnof the displaced populations. To carry out this mission UNAMID had to deal with a Sudanesegovernment that discussed peace with diplomats and journalists, while pursuing the war.36 Ibid., p.217.117
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Juan Emilio CheyreDirector, Center
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