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UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206The Machakos Protocol became the first chapter of the 2005 Comprehensive PeaceAgreement (CPA). Although the Sudanese government was initially reluctant to continue withIGAD as leading the process, eventually the whole process was concluded under its auspices.Part of Sudan’s reluctance can be explained by the fact that IGAD was also representing manygovernments hostile to Khartoum, including Eritrea and Uganda.The CPA provided Southern Sudan to hold a referendum on secession from the North in2011. As mentioned, apart from the fact that parties were required to make unity as attractiveas possible, there was no conditionality on reform of the governance system in Sudan. Manyobservers considered very likely that the south would break away after the 2011 referendum.Despite that Garang made a convincing bid to become the president of a united Sudan, thefact that Khartoum would never give in on secular demands, always made this a distantlikelihood.2.7. Beyond the CPA, a Role for EthiopiaFor Ethiopia and for Meles in particular the CPA was a very unattractive proposition.Through the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, it had lost its leverage over Sudan at what became adecisive period of time. Now that secession became increasingly likely, Ethiopia needed toengage even more to prevent a badly governed South Sudan from becoming a danger tostability at Ethiopia’s borders. The regions of Gambella (bordering Southern Sudan’s Jongleistate) and Benishangul-Gumuz (bordering northern Sudan’s Blue Nile state) were still areasof unrest and the nearby presence of SPLA could stir unrest towards the government in AddisAbaba. Secondly, Ethiopia would need to manage its relations with Khartoum carefully toprevent it from turning towards Egypt for support. Ethiopia was also on its way to create anextensive dam-building programme for the purposes of developing hydro-power and to alimited extent also for agriculture. It would need Sudan for developing these resources.From June 2008, Ethiopia has been the chair of IGAD and currently still holds theposition. Mainly from the background, Ethiopia has been able to leverage this position andobtain access to all the parties. Other international parties, including the United Nations, theUnited States and others have also embraced this position for Ethiopia in order to involvethem, without asking all neighbouring countries to join the process. The fact that Ethiopiadoes not provide opportunities for other countries to take over the IGAD-chairmanship, whichusually rotates, does create some tension with other IGAD members, waiting for theirmoment in the limelight.In October 2009 the African Union also established its own framework for theimplementation of the CPA. To this end, and based on the existing structure of the AfricanUnion Panel for Darfur (AUPD), the African Union High-level Implementation Panel forSudan (AUHIP) was created. After the referendum for southern secession, the AUHIP wasalso tasked to help the parties achieve an orderly secession process. After the independence ofSouth Sudan, the AUHIP 28 became a de facto mediation in resolving outstanding issuesbetween the countries after the secession as well as conflicts emanating from theimplementation of certain parts of the agreement.In January 2011, while Southern Sudan voted overwhelmingly for secession, the peopleof the Abyei region did not get to vote on their own referendum which, as part of the CPA,was scheduled on the same day. Through this referendum, the Abyei voters would be allowed28 In 2012 the AUHIP was renamed “African Union High-level Implementation Panel for Sudan and SouthSudan”, to reflect its mandate for the new country as well.132
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206to vote on whether their area would be part of the northern or southern part of the country. Asthe government and the SPLA were not able to agree on who was eligible to vote, the Abyeireferendumnever took place and it resulted in major unrest in the area. In May 2011, the SAFmoved in and occupied Abyei, where until then only Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) 29 wereallowed. When fighting ensued, international partners under the leadership of the AUHIPbrought the parties together to stop the fighting. 30 In the background Ethiopia had also beenclosely involved. On 27 June, only seven days after the agreement between the SPLM and thegovernment was reached, the UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted resolution 1990 whichestablished the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). Thispeacekeeping mission was staffed completely by the Ethiopian army and was under Ethiopiancommand. Now, in addition to being the seat of the AU and the chairman of IGAD, it nowalso held a UNSC mandate to send its own military in a crucial Sudanese border region.According to some leading experts who were familiar with the negotiations, prime ministerMeles insisted that any outside military intervention would need to be a United Nationsmission under UNSC mandate, rather than an African Union mission under a AUPSC 31mandate. A UN mission would be more likely to financially support the mission and throughthe endorsement of the UNSC, Ethiopia would have the explicit support for its mission by allmajor western powers as well as Russia and China.Ethiopia created an interesting precedent by providing military support to the peaceprocess. It was now actively exercising a dual role as a peace mediator and a peace-keeper. Italso managed to align itself with the major global players and get their endorsement. Inparticular the support of the United States was important for Ethiopia as it is needed inrelation to the development of its domestic economic agenda, which primarily involved thedevelopment of the dams programme. By showing this commitment to the process in Sudan –Ethiopia has never had any other active engagements in peacekeeping around the world- italso gained a lot of respect from other international partners and was reaffirmed in its leadingrole in the region as a mediator and peace-keeper. Finally, the fact that both Sudanese partieshave accepted Ethiopian soldiers in Abyei is a display of how this bordering country has nowcemented its role as a neutral and impartial arbiter in the Sudanese conflict.3. Ethiopia’s Strategic Policy for Sudan and South Sudan, 1991-20123.1. Meles’ Vision for SudanUnder both the Derg regime and under the EPRDF coalition, Ethiopia held important interestsin keeping Sudan unified. Meles strongly favoured a unified Sudan, despite that the conceptof self-determination, and so the possibility of a South Sudanese secession was put forward inthe DoP by one of his own ministers. According to an observer, the concept of selfdeterminationwas included in the DoP for two particular and critical reasons:29 JIUs were an implementation mechanism which brought together the SPLA and SAF to control the borderareas, including the three areas.30 “Agreement Between The Government of the Republic of Sudan and The Sudan’s People’s LiberationMovement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area”, Addis Ababa,20 June 2011.31 The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) is the major decision making body of the AfricanUnion on matters for Peace and Security.133
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ISSN 1696-2206 Nº 33 Octubre /Octo
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Juan Emilio CheyreDirector, Center
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