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UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206The international monitoring of the ceasefire was complemented by the JIUs, whichwere to become a joint neutral force to promote collaboration between the two protagonists.The JIUs included joint troops in equal numbers from the SAF and the SPLA deployed inSouthern Sudan (24,000), Nuba Mountains (6,000), Southern Blue Nile (6,000), andKhartoum (3,000). 83 However, they had limited contribution to stability. Largely ill-equippedand standing forces, they were not used to actively promote peace and became known of theirinternal squabbles that at times posed a wider security threat. 84The CPA also stipulated that the existing Other Armed Groups, mainly a number ofmilitias in Southern Sudan, needed either to be integrated to the SAF and the SPLM/A(deemed by the CPA as the Southern Sudanese army) or disbanded. 85 After Garang’s deaththe SPLM/A leadership, and particularly Kiir, was generally successful in seekingrapprochement with some of the armed groups that had fought the SPLA during the war, butits attempts to end the security threat they posed failed. Some groups opposing the SPLM/Anever entered the DDR process and some sought refuge and support within the structures ofthe Sudanese army. The initial efforts by the SPLM/A in 2005 and 2006 to neutralize suchgroups by forced disarmament generated large amounts of casualties, particularly in Jonglei’sand Unity State’s Nuer and Shilluk heartlands where armed groups continued to contest theSPLA imposed GoSS order. These efforts were criticized to target specifically SPLM/Adefiant groups such as supporters of the SPLM-Democratic Change (SPLM-DC) and SouthSudan Defense Force opposition parties, and were periodically put on hold. Although notposing a direct threat to the government in Juba, outbreaks of violence related to these effortsand other grievances, including inter-ethnic hostility and violent cattle-raiding persisted,generating local instability and preventing the extension of GoSS control and SPLA“monopoly of violence” over parts of Southern Sudanese territory.From the signing of the CPA onwards, the SPLM/A emphasized security sector reformas a priority. This effort, heavily supported by the international partners in benefit ofconsolidation of the SPLM/A and the GoSS, includes the transition of the SPLA from aguerrilla force to a standing army and the establishment of an effective police force. 86 Afterthe initial forced attempts for disarmament failed and caused a great number of casualties inlocalities mainly in Jonglei, the GoSS adopted a more gradual but equally violent approach.In 2009 an internationally supported DDR program began. 87 The Southern SudanDisarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission (SSDDRC) endorsed by theUN, a number of Western governments, NGOs, and multilateral organizations, performed thepreparatory work for this and concentrated on demobilization and reintegration. However, thiswas immensely expensive and it became obvious that the SSDDRC did not have capacity tomeet its ambitious objective of reintegrating 34,000 individuals defined as special needsgroup, 56,000 active SPLA soldiers, and possible 20,000-30,000 soldiers from the JIUs. Theprocess was criticized to be of limited use for the targeted individuals in terms of buildingsustainable livelihoods, and it was hard for the receiving communities to absorb the excombatants,while the process suffered from inefficiency and lack of capacity toaccommodate large numbers of ex-combatants despite being generously funded. Although the83 CPA, op. cit., pp. 87-88.84 Verjee, Aly: “Sudan’s Aspirational Army: A History of the Joint Integrated Units”, SSR Issue Papers 2, TheCentre for International Governance Innovation, 2011.85 CPA, op. cit., p. 100.86 Abatneh, Abraham S. and Lubang, Simon M.: “Police Reform and State Formation in Southern Sudan”,Canadian Journal of Development Studies, vol. 32, n° 1 (2011), pp. 94-108.87 This paragraph is based on interviews in November-December 2010 in Juba.30
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206SSDDRC monitored the DDR process and coordinated and conducted reintegration programs,the disarmament itself was left to be carried out by the Ministry of Interior and local chiefs,former of which is known for applying more repressive, including military, measures bydeploying the SPLA.The international actors attempted to increase security sector capacity by supporting thetraining of the South Sudan Police Service (SSPS). Although progress from 2005 was made,these programs were marred by difficulties because Juba failed to prioritize them. 88 Moreover,many of the recruits for training included former SPLA soldiers whose guerrilla training andexperience as rebels often conditioned them to certain behavior towards civilian populationthat was difficult to change. Allegedly, the SSPS recruitment process was also politicized andat times “tribalized” to hand positions and channel resources for constituents. The UnitedNations Police Force provided training and monitored the daily activities of the SSPS, but aswith the SPLA, recurrent human rights violations took place. 89Thus, during 2005-2011 the international approach to support the security sectortransformation in Southern Sudan suffered from enormous challenges. Not only was it largelyconditioned by the SPLM/A’s preferences, but it tended to lack the perspective of those beingsubjected to disarmament and abuses by the security apparatus. Also, the capacity to respondin time to local violence hardly improved. This, together with targeted efforts to disarmcertain groups and not providing for their security subsequently, undermined the legitimacy ofthe entire process and the SPLM/A authority as a security provider. Not only did the hardmeasures lead to rearmament particularly in various locations in Greater Upper Nile, but theyundermined collaboration between the state and sections of local groups. The danger ofcomplete loss of control of parts of its territory was particularly relevant in those areas whereSPLM/A support was weak (i.e. parts of Jonglei and Unity states) or where armed groupswere active and the security forces had only temporary or seasonal access (i.e. parts ofWestern Equatoria).A persisting problem of the security sector has been the recurrent incidences ofviolence. The existence of armed groups, bands, and individuals, along with the proliferationof small arms, has resulted in chronic insecurity among civilian population both in towns andrural areas. This situation, together with external threat mainly from Khartoum, has enabledthe GoSS to justify the promotion of the state’s security apparatus as a top priority over otherpending issues. Security sector has therefore remained as the main end of the GoSS expenses.During the Interim Period, the GoSS’ security apparatus, the SPLA and the embryonicsouthern police force, were unable to eradicate locally occurring clashes. This was partlybecause of the abovementioned lack of capacity and reach to remote areas, and partly due torepressive means it applied to address such situations which often caused further violence.Regionally, violent incidents concentrated for the most part in Abyei, Greater Upper Nile,Jonglei, Lakes, and Western Equatoria, with the motivations ranging from those of anti-SPLM/A political grievances of armed groups and splinter factions, cattle-raiding, borderdisputes to CPA related conflicts, and violence inflicted the marauding Lord’s ResistanceArmy.First, during 2005-2010 the CPA-related conflicts lingered on particularly in Abyeiwhere the impasse over the region’s belonging to Northern or Southern Sudan had not been88 Abtneh and Lubang, op. cit.89 Interview with United Nations Police officers, December 2010 in Torit.31
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