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UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206Sudan. The Muraheelen were armed by the SAF to attack their Dinka neighbours since 1985.The Dinka were regarded as the civilian base of the SPLA, and the Baggara (and soldiers)were and are rewarded with total impunity and war booty: cattle, grain and human beings(women and children). 12 Often the Muraheelen conducted joint operations with the army. Theraids expanded as the civil war progressed with very devastating effects on Dinkacommunities. The government turned to arming the Baggara as militias in the past becauseconscription was unpopular in Sudan. The traditional role of the Muraheleen was toaccompany the herds of cattle ahead of the rest of the tribe in the seasonal movement of theherds; they travelled on horseback, and were traditionally armed to protect themselves andtheir herds against wild animals and cattle raiders. The equivalents of the Muraheleen amongthe Rezeigat of South Darfur are called “Fursan”, the Arabic word for horsemen.One important function of the Muraheleen since 1989 was to accompany the militarysupply train to Wau. They put their horses on the train, which were taken out on reachingBahr el Ghazal and used against Dinka villages. The Dinka, who do not have horses, alsolacked modern weapons and protection because Northern Bahr el Ghazal was not consideredof strategic military importance to the SPLA. One of the consequences of the deliberate policyof transferring formal into informal warfare contributed to the spread of violence andinsecurity across the countryside. The divide-and-rule military tactics of the warring parties inthe major conflict areas produced sharp differences between the Misseriya and the Dinka whoused to share grazing land, watering points and the like. This unfolding event destroyed thevital traditional systems of maintaining peace between communities in the border areas.The two groups seem to have realized the destructive consequences of the externalinterventions in their “local politics”. For the Rezeigat, the new reality was that their futuresurvival depended in re-establishing good relations with the Dinka. The number ofconferences and peace treaties during the past few years appears to be a manifestation of thisnew realism. Both groups realized that in spite of the often bad relations, intermarriages takeplace, (mostly with Rezeigat marrying Dinka girls). The complexion of many Rezeigat andMisseriya Zuruq (Black Misseriya) probably reveals this fact of intermarriages. Prior toindependence, even during the period of the “Closed District Ordinance”, both groups werebrought together annually to attend conferences that reviewed the relations between them.Chiefs from other parts of South and North Sudan were brought to attend these conferences.All disputes were settled in these meetings, including the payment of ‘diya’ (blood money),return of stolen cattle and abducted girls.The Dinka/Baggara rivalry escalated from tribal animosity to a government strategy ofcounterinsurgency operations in which some of the Baggara groups became governmentproxies in military expeditions against the Dinka of Northern Bahr al Ghazal and the NgokDinka. The latter were perceived as the backbone of the SPLA/M. This role for the Misseriyawas forged under the Military rule of Nimeiri and applied by the Democratic Government in1986-89. The Babanusa-Aweil-Wau railway corridor is one of the most important routeslinking the South to the North. Since its completion the railway reduced the importance of theriver route to Wau. This corridor had played a significant role in all South-North conflicts.In the past, the government had strict control over the annual movement of theMisseriya to the dry season grazing areas, but with time this control became loose and theMisseriya had less fear of camping in Nuer and Dinka during this part of the year. TheMisseriya regarded all land as belonging to the government and, therefore, they claimed the12 Jok, Jok Madut (2007): Sudan: Race, Religion, and Violence, Oxford, One World, pp.216-217.98
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206right to use it. Thus, disputes arose between the Misseriya, the Dinka and the Fellata nomadsfrom West Africa who also used the area for grazing.Mechanisms used to exist for settling conflicts between the Baggara and the Dinka,mostly by inter-tribal conferences backed by the power of the state. Agreements between thetwo sides produced truces from time to time. During the first civil war (1955-1972), theBaggara entered into grazing agreements with local commanders of the Anyanya southernguerrilla movement. They paid taxes in form of money or cattle in order to graze and watertheir livestock in Bahr el Ghazal during the dry season. These agreements were not renewedat the outset of the second civil war. However, the Baggara began to make annual armedincursions into Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile, taking advantage of the local unarmedpopulations. Since the beginning of the second civil war in 1983, the national government didnot intervene to settle disputes between the Baggara and the Dinka.Annual peace conferences were an effective mechanism for addressing issues emergingfrom continuous interaction over grazing and water for a whole year. These conferences wereuseful in mitigating tension among border communities. The security and organization ofmigratory grazing routes were among items of the agenda of peace meetings. During thecolonial era, Safaha at the southern bank of the Kiir/ Bahr al Arab was identified as the seat ofpeace meetings. The reconciliation conference convened in Babanusa in 1976 recommendedappointment of the joint security committee at Safaha, with equal representation while theleadership of the committee alternated between the Dinka and the Baggara. The conferencealso recommended the formation of the grazing committee to be responsible for the pasturesand water. It was also recommended that the river be a temporary borderline between the twoprovinces of Bahr el Ghazal and Darfur until the issue of the boundary would be resolved. 13Furthermore, the Rezeigat tribe committed themselves to the payment of 450,000 Sudanesepounds as Dia 14 for the victims, whereas one-third of the total were paid to Aweil Districtauthorities, but could not reach the families of the victims.The May Revolution under the leadership of Jaafar Nimeiri assumed power in Sudanwith his socialist agenda, targeting the native administrational institutions. President Nimeiridecreed the liquidation of native administration in 1975 and replaced the system with basicunits of the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU). 15 This unfortunate step from Khartoum affected thepeaceful coexistence between the two communities because the institution, which was knownfor its dedication to maintaining communal peace, was not longer there. In 1976, the regimedecided to shift the location of meetings from Safaha to Babanusa. The change in the locationof the meetings was imposed by an incident, which took place at Safaha during the conferencein 1974 when a certain Rezeigi notable declared in preparatory meetings that the children willplay tomorrow, a threat which meant more fighting. Indeed, the fighting occurred on that day.Therefore, the authorities decided to shift the venue of the meetings to Babanusa and itcontinued to host the conferences for five years until the eruption of the civil war in 1983.The area under study in this section provides an example of the relationship betweentwo groups that have the same economic background, but who differ with respect to religionand “race”, and where the impact of the current civil war has been immense on both humanand animal population. The Kiir/Bahr al Arab region is the transitional zone that links the13 Minutes and resolutions of the Reconciliatory Conference, Babanusa, 1976.14 Dia is the blood compensation in form of money or cows.15 Wol, Dhieu M. Diing (2010): Pastoralists, Boundary and Dispute: The administration and conflictmanagement in 14- Miles south of Kiir/ Bahr el Arab, (unpublished paper presented at a meeting of the AfricanUnion High Implementation Panel), pp. 24-29.99
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Juan Emilio CheyreDirector, Center
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