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UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206especially in ethnically divided societies national identity may be guided by sophisticatedconstitutional engineering. 26 This implies that nationbuilding is a top-down process in whichelites, as part of political competition, construct and manipulate distinct layers of identities. 27Here the use of symbolism becomes vital. According to Butz, inclusive and new“neutral” national symbols which include all groups could allow the establishment ofcommon overarching national identity, binding often ethnically heterogeneous post-warsocieties. 28 It has also been suggested that such symbols need to have rich content andcomplicated in structure to allow room for distinct interpretations among populations thatform a fragmented and heterogeneous community at best, particularly when potentiallycontentious inter-group relations prevail. 29However, peace-through-statebuilding interventions can lack emphasis onnationbuilding. Too heavy focus on building peace through the creation of state institutions inthe short-term, but without ensuring their legitimacy that can be achieved through effectivenationbuilding, may be insufficient in establishing state authority particularly in highlyfragmented and polarized post-conflict societies. Since most conflicts in such societies aredriven by exclusion and marginalization, inclusive nationbuilding becomes essential part oflong-term peacebuilding.Finally, combining nationbuilding with statebuilding allows an approach that drawsheavily from the local communities in a bottom-up manner in building unity at the nationallevel. This is likely to lead to increasing feeling of inclusiveness and legitimacy of governanceand the state by diminishing “structural violence”. It would allow the promotion of conditionsof “positive peace” in the long-term. Yet, despite the wide recognition of the need of building“positive peace”, external peace-through-statebuilding have often remained largely exclusivein their focus to (re)construct state institutions and structures.The next sections of this article concentrate on peacebuilding in Southern Sudan duringthe CPA implementation (2005-2011). They point out the external interveners’ almostexclusive focus on peace-through-statebuilding and narrow partnership with the SPLM/Aelite, without insisting on a consistent and inclusive process of nationbuilding to bringlegitimacy to the newly established state institutions. It is argued that given the SPLM/A’slimited legitimacy in many parts of southern Sudan, and due to the persistent organized armedviolence, inclusive nationbuilding should be prioritized and systematically pursued as aconflict resolution mechanism to treat exclusion and marginalization, major root causes ofviolence.26 Kerr, Michael: “A Culture of Power Sharing”, in Taylor, Rupert (ed.) (2009): Consociational Theory:McGarry and O’Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict, London, Routledge, pp. 206-220.27 Posner, Daniel N. (2005): Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, New York, NY, Cambridge UniversityPress; and Eifert, Benn; Miguel, Edward and Posner, Daniel N.: “Political Competition and Ethnic Identificationin Africa”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 54, n° 2 (2010), pp. 494-510.28 Butz, David A. (2009): National Symbols as Agents of Psychological and Social Change, Amherst, MA,University of Massachusetts Press, p. 21.29 Cerulo, Karen A. (1995): Identity Designs: The Sights and Sounds of a Nation, New Brunswick, NJ, RutgersUniversity Press.18
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-22063. War in Southern Sudan and the CPAThe protracted insurgencies in Southern Sudan have attracted academic attention for a longtime. The first insurgency (1955-1972) has been widely covered, and the second rebellion(1983-2005) has received even more scholarly interest, while many influential works on thewars as a whole also exist. 30 Southern Sudan has long history of violence, but in 1955 it beganto experience armed conflict as a result of decolonization which had led to the marginalizationof southern elite at the national level and annexation of Southern Sudan to the Sudanese stateas its southern borderland. The first insurgency intensified significantly only in the early1960s when armed opposition consolidated. Yet, the heterogeneous Southern Sudanese armedfactions forged under the loose leadership of Southern Sudan Liberation Front/Movementremained as the underdog and was pressured to accept a peace agreement mediated byEthiopia in 1972. Although the Addis Ababa Agreement established self-government withlimited autonomy in the region, and became part of the Sudanese constitution of 1973, theperiod of self-rule failed to bring together the ethnically highly heterogeneous population andsections of its leadership which continued to engage in severe, and occasionally violent,political competition along ethnic lines. This was one of the reasons that permitted the centralgovernment to manipulate southern political scene and weaken the southern regionalgovernment until its unilateral dissolution in 1983 by President Jaafar Nimeiri thatcontradicted the national constitution.This situation set the stage for the second rebellion in Southern Sudan which began in1983. Again, politicized ethnic differences led to severe violence within Southern Sudan,which yet again was manipulated by Khartoum. However, by mid-1980s the SPLM/A, forgedaround leadership of military men from the Southern Sudan’s Dinka majority, had gainedupper hand among armed groups in the region and subsequently conquered most of it whileKhartoum supported local ethnic militias and self-defense groups in its counterinsurgencycampaign. Yet, a military coup in 1989 in Khartoum brought an Islamist faction of thenorthern ruling elite to power and the government gained an upper hand in the war. This,together with the collapse of its main backer, the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, weakened theSPLM/A, while it had also suffered a split that led to devastating fighting between sections ofthe Dinka and the second largest ethnic group in Southern Sudan, the Nuer. Soon, however,the SPLM/A began to receive support from Uganda, Eritrea, and Western powers headed bythe United States (US), which again turned the tables.Many Southern Sudanese have fought for self-determination in a context of political,economic, and social state marginalization. 31 Since the late 19 th century Southern Sudan hadbeen only loosely integrated in the Sudanese polity and the protracted insurgencies hinderedthis process further. At the same time, however, the conflict had maintained Southern Sudan30 For the first conflict, see i.e. Eprile, Cecil (1974): War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955-1972, London, David &Charles; O’Ballance, Edgar (1977): The Secret War in the Sudan: 1955-1972, London, Faber and Faber; andPoggo, Scopas S. (2008): The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the Southern Sudan,1955-1972, New York, NY, Palgrave Macmillan. For accounts that mainly concentrate on the secondinsurgency, see i.e. Deng, Francis M. (1995): War of Visions: Conflict Identities in the Sudan, Washington, DC,The Brookings Institution; Lesch, Ann Mosely. (1998): The Sudan: Contested National Identities. Bloomington,IN, Indiana University Press; Jok, Jok M. (2001): War and Slavery in Sudan, Philadelphia, PA. University ofPennsylvania Press; Jok, Jok M. (2007): Sudan: Race, Religion and Violence, Oxford, Oneworld; and Johnson,op. cit.31 See Ylönen, Aleksi: “On Sources of Political Violence in Africa: The Case of ‘Marginalizing State’ in Sudan”,Política y Cultura, n° 32 (2009), pp. 37-59; and Ylönen, Aleksi (forthcoming): On State, Marginalization, andOrigins of Rebellion: The Formation of Insurgencies in Southern Sudan, Trenton (NJ), Africa World Press/TheRed Sea Press.19
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