Real freedom for all turtles in Sugarscape? - Presses universitaires ...

362A r g u i n g a b o u t j u s t i c eSuppose that 10000 Euro per head are up for redistribution annually, aftercollection of tax.The neutral status of maximum basic income: two conflicting viewsWhat is the neutral distribution of the gift rent captured by tax? On thepremise of Van Parijs’s argument, we must start by converting 10000 Eurosof tax revenue into the auction metric. This gives us half of a F-unit, 50% ofthe value of average auction proceeds. Once the tax yield is assessed in theauction metric, it necessarily appears as undifferentiated gift rent. On thetwo-steps argument, maximum basic income wins. However, if we regardthe tax yield as 50% of average Euro auction proceeds (i.e. half of 20000Euro, given a = 2/3 and s = 2/7), then an equal sharing scheme following thedivision into the free gift and the work-related gift is the winning candidate.To operate such a sharing scheme requires that the government shouldensure opportunities for work closely similar to the types of work of our giftexample. The scheme then dispenses 5000 Euros unconditionally, and giveseverybody a maximum of 5000 Euros in return for up to half the averageamounts of gift work required in the auction situation.Since this division of the tax to be shared out depends on the prices of A-gifts and S-gifts, the partly work-conditional scheme respects the neutralvaluation process of the auction in the following sense. Considerbeneficiaries of redistribution who do not choose to perform work similar togift work, when given the opportunties to do so at the auction’s Euro rewardrates. In the context of our example, we may call such people the ‘voluntarilyunemployed’. They are relevantly like the members of the F-group ofbidders in the auction. Since the latter do not envy the gift bundles of thetwo other groups, they acknowledge that they have no fair claim to thework-related part of the auction proceeds. Therefore, all the voluntarilyunemployed can claim under a neutral sharing scheme is the share of taxrevenue which corresponds to the free gift part of the auction proceeds. Thepartly work-conditional sharing scheme follows this judgement. For thisreason, I claim, it beats maximum basic income on grounds of liberalneutrality.The role of the auctionTwo conflicting claims about the liberally neutral status of maximum basicincome are on the table. They depend on different ways of presenting thevery same facts about how the tax yield can be linked to the outcome of theauction specified in our example. Since nothing substantive turns on these