Real freedom for all turtles in Sugarscape? - Presses universitaires ...

58A r g u i n g a b o u t j u s t i c einteractions with others. These specific policies may – or may not – survive acloser examination. But the core idea is that society ought to pay dueattention to the legal and social structures that enhance or constrictopportunities for relationship formation.It may seem that relational freedom demands too much of the state. If thelaw should do more to foster intimate relationships, why shouldn’t itpromote other relationships as well? Suppose that Sheila, a competitiveswimmer, wants very badly to train with a specific coach, Coach X, but hetrains only a few swimmers each year. Doesn’t society owe it to Sheila to doall it can to redress the shortage of Coach X’s time?But our two principles imply limits on what society owes Sheila. She oughtto receive a basic income, and she ought to grow up in conditions that giveher a fair chance to choose and act upon a vision of the good. She ought tohave an equal chance to bid on the swim coach’s time. Even so, the swimcoach should be able to set his own terms, including not only a swimmer’sability to pay his fee but also the swimmer’s talent and personality.The larger point is that society need not (and should not) maximizeSheila’s chance at working with a top swim coach, any more than it shouldmaximize Justine’s chance of marrying. Instead, the goal is to provide fairaccess to a variety of life options.The second principle points out an additional deficiency in backgroundconditions: a just society should offer a variety of options for structuringpeer relationships, but U.S. marriage law offers (in effect) just two: marriageand everything else. Most states offer just one version of marriage, leavingother relationships largely unregulated; and most states do not recognizeefforts to set the terms of intimate relationships by contract.The law could offer a broader set of options for defining financial and legalobligations. The law might, for example, provide a "check the box" menu toallow conjugal and nonconjugal couples to specify the duration of therelationship, expectations for support during the relationship and afterward,and the desired arrangements for property ownership, inheritance, andhealth care proxies and visitation (Kavanagh 2004).One potential problem is that a check-the-box regime could permit someindividuals to disclaim obligations to vulnerable people. No-fault divorce,for instance, expanded freedom for women and men to exit relationships.But it also left many women poor. How, if at all, should the law respond tothe possibility that check-the-box relationships could improve the situationof the powerful at the expense of the vulnerable?The problem merits careful analysis, but as a first cut, we can imaginedefault rules or mandatory terms that could protect women (or men)engaged in traditionally female roles. These protections are most important